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3 1. Foreword 
autoPous is a strategy consulting firm specialising in the automotive industry 
and founded in 1993. The partners and associates have senior consulting and 
management  experience  with  leading  international  firms  both  within  the 
automotive sector and beyond. 
The firm  has worked with clients  large  and small from  all  sectors  of the 
industry,  throughout  the  world:  vehicle  manufacturers,  systems  and 
components suppliers, vehicle and parts distributors, service chains, financial 
institutions, governments and consumer associations. We are based in France, 
the UK and the US, and also work extensively in Asia-Pacific. 
We are independent.  Through the combination of the analytical disciplines of 
leading consultancies and of industry knowledge and experience, we create 
objective,  in-depth appraisals of true industry dynamics,  starting from  the 
market backwards. 
In  tackling  this  assignment,  we  have  simply  looked  at  how  the  existing 
business system functions, at what advantages and disadvantages it has for its 
different stakeholders, and what alternatives already exist. 
This report expresses our own considered view of the current system and of 
the sales/  service link. 
John Wormald and Vicky Gardner 
Co-authors. 
4 2. Introduction 
As  Regulation  1475.95  approaches  the  end  of  its  life,  the  European 
Commission is  examining whether and how to replace  it.  As  part of its 
preparations, the Directorate-General for Competition asked autt7?ous  to help 
deepen its understanding of one of the foundations of the current Selective 
and Exclusive Distribution System (SED).  This is  the claim that there is  a 
natural link between the selling and the servicing (taken to include necessary 
repairs) of road vehicles. 
Recital4 to Regulation 1475.95 states: 
The  exclusive and selective distribution  clauses  can  be  regarded as  indispensable 
measures o.f rationalisation in the motor vehicle indust!'}ft  because motor vehicles are 
consumer  durab/es  which  at both  regular  and irregular  intervals  require  expert 
maintenance and  repai~; not always in the same place.  Motor vehicle manu.focturers 
cooperate  with  the  selected dealers  and repairers  in order  to  provtde  specialised 
servicing  for the product.  On grounds o.f  capacity and  efficiency a/on~ such a fonn o.f 
cooperation cannot be extended to an unlimited number o.f  dealers and repairers.  The 
linking o.f servicing and distribution  must be  regarded as  more  efficient  than  a 
separation between a distribution organisation for new vehicles on the one hand  and  a 
servicing  organisation  which  would  also  distribute  spare  parts  on  the  othe~; 
particularly  a~ bifore a new vehicle is delivered to the  final  consume~; the undertaking 
within the distribution system must give if a technical inspection according to the 
manu.focturers spec(Jication. 
The link between sales and service is  an important aspect of the system by 
which vehicles are sold and supported in service.  But it is only one aspect of 
that system and must be viewed in the context of the whole system, under all 
its aspects.  This can be seen in the arguments put forward by the industry for 
the  maintenance  of  the  current system,  which  have  been  summarised  as 
follows: 1 
•  Automotive goods are unique 
•  A free-for-all in distribution is unsuitable 
•  The Selective and Exclusive Distribution systems best benefits consumers, 
because: access is secured to highly-qualified, specialist dealers; consumer 
choice  is  the  biggest  in  Europe;  inter-brand  competition  in  Europe  is 
probably the strongest in the world; intra-brand competition is strong; and 
motor vehicle  distribution in Europe is  one of the most efficient in the 
world 
•  The basic elements of motor vehicle distribution and service are: qualitative 
selection of dealers; quantitative selection of dealers; combined sales and 
1 "ACEA's position on motor vehicle distribution in the European Union, A system of selective 
and exclusive distribution and servicing is the best option for consumers dealers and 
manufacturers";"  ACEA position paper regarding the European Commission's questionnaire 
on the application of the Automotive Block Exemption", October 2000 
5 service; no sales to resellers not part of the network; brand exclusivity at 
the point of sale; limited territorial exclusivity for dealers; and direct access 
to the consumer 
•  The industry has been one of the earliest adopters of e-commerce but it is 
not intended to cut out the dealer 
•  Price competition is strong and national price differences are caused by 
differences in taxation and currency fluctuations, not the SED, and are less 
than in other consumer goods sectors.  A  free-for-all distribution system 
will not abolish them and SED  is in fact  the system most conducive to 
satisfactory alignment of prices 
•  These  statements  are  broadly  supported  by  various  recent  studies, 
undertaken  by  some  of  the  best-known  academic  experts  on  the 
automotive sector 2 3 4 s 6 
We set out to evaluate the nature of the sales/  service link by performing four 
tasks: 
•  Examining the  historical and current structures and functioning of the 
sales and service markets in Europe.  The purpose is to place the link in the 
broader context of the multiple sectors that constitute vehicle distribution 
and retailing, and the aftermarket (the market for services and parts, once 
the vehicle is in operation) 
•  Identifying the forces acting upon these sectors and how they may change 
market and competitive structures.  These include the composition of the 
vehicle  pare;  technologies  incorporated into vehicles  (notably on-board 
electronic systems); the effects of the improved quality and durability of 
components; electronic means of communication (including the Internet); 
the attitudes and expectations of consumers; and the activities of specific 
categories of participants in the market 
•  Following a vehicle through its life, from initial shopping by consumers, 
through ordering, delivery, warranty and non-warranty service and repair 
interventions, part-exchange and reselling, and the end of the vehicle's life. 
We identify the sub-components of economic activity and examine how 
and why they are (or are not) interrelated.  The objective is to establish 
which  of  these  links  are  natural,  which  are  in  some  way  forced  by 
interested parties, and how indispensable they in fact are 
2 "Die Bedeutung von Vertriebsbindungsystemen in den Europaischen Automobilmarkten", 
Professor F. Dudenhoffer, University of Applied Sciences, Gelsenkirchen, Germany, September 
2000 
3 "Selective and Exclusive Distribution System: "How it Benefits the Consumer", Professor 
D.G. Rhys, Centre of Automotive Industry Research, Cardiff Business School, UK, August 2000 
4 "Views on competitive mechanisms in the automobile industry, with specific focus on the 
selective and exclusive distribution system", Professor G. Volpato, Ca' Foscari University of 
Venice, 1  taly 
s "Pricing in Euroland", Lehman Brothers, July 1998 
6 "Road work ahead", Glenn Mercer, McKinsey & Company, Automotive World Opinion, 
June-July 2000 
6 •  Drawing some conclusions about the nature of the allegedly natural link 
between sales  and service:  whether it  is  necessary  and justified,  as  it 
currently exists; what issues are raised by the impact of new technologies 
(notably the spread of on-board electronics and the associated diagnostic 
systems, and the Internet); and whether satisfactory alternative structures 
are  available,  or could reasonably  be introduced,  which would satisfy 
consumer demand. 
This analysis was performed in a relatively short space of time, September and 
October 2000.  We have relied on three main sources of information: 
•  Existing material available to the European Commission and ourselves, 
which documents market structures and functioning 
•  The relevant parts of responses to the Commission's questionnaire  about 
the  SED  system,  widely  circulated  within  the  European  automotive 
industry in September 1999 
•  Responses  from  the  industry  to  a  further  set  of  questions  put  to 
participants by the Commission in August 2000 as part of this analysis. 
7 3. The sales/service link must be seen in the broader context of how SED 
operates 
3.1 Jhe sales-service link is a maior support ofthe vehicle industzys wav o(operating 
The question we are examining is, in effect, whether the sale of new vehicles 
naturally  drives  everything  that  happens  in  the  service  markets  (the 
automotive aftermarket)  thereafter.  We are looking in this analysis at the 
whole  downstream  area  of the  automotive  industry,  "beyond  the  factory 
gate", the whole of user experience with vehicles, and the involvement of a 
large and varied set of participants in the delivery of vehicles, services and 
parts. One must therefore also look beyond the new vehicle ownership cycle 
into the subsequent cycles, when it becomes a used vehicle, of increasing age, 
until it is retired from service. 
But the  issues  are  even broader.  The  sales-service  link  is  a  fundamental 
structural  and  operating  premise  of the  automotive  industry.  Its  visible 
manifestation to the consumer is the combination of sales and service outlets 
within the franchised dealer format.  Yet it goes much further and deeper than 
that: 
•  Only 20-25%  of spare parts are produced by the vehicle manufacturers, 
while 75-80%  are bought in from suppliers.  The vehicle manufacturers act 
as range assemblers and distributors to the dealers.  They have invested 
heavily  in  very  sophisticated  and  efficient  parts  procurement, 
warehousing, logistics, cataloguing and IT systems for this purpose. They 
take a considerable gross margin on the parts, often in the 60-65%  range. 
The  spare  parts  business  typically  makes  a  large  contribution  to  their 
profitability.  As this is  generally low (see  the McKinsey study'), spare 
parts business frequently subsidises marginal profits or losses on vehicle 
operations 
•  The same generally applies to those component suppliers for whose parts 
there is an aftermarket (the term used in the industry to describe demand 
for parts and services that arises after the vehicle is first put into service). 
They are put under severe price pressure by their vehicle manufacturer 
customers in original equipment (OE) business, i.e.  the supply of systems 
and components to the vehicle assembly lines.  They often have to make up 
for these low margins by obtaining higher ones for aftermarket business. 
These suppliers are therefore understandably extremely concerned about 
the  protection of their right to  sell  their  OE  parts through all  possible 
channels into the aftermarket 
7 "Road work ahead", Glenn Mercer, McKinsey & Company, Automotive World Opinion, 
June-July 2000 
8 •  Within  the  dealership,  parts and  service  revenues  cross-subsidise  new 
vehicle sales.  This is generally recognised and indeed promoted by the 
industry as a positive virtue 
•  For the consumer, there is an evident element of comfort and security in 
dealing with one organisation, which supplies the new vehicle,  offers a 
complete set of services to support it in operation, and is set up to take the 
vehicle back in part exchange for a new one, if  desired. 
Further arguments are produced in support of the existing SED system, which 
are presumed not to be available in a "free-for-all" distribution situation: 
•  Network coverage is assured, even in less populated areas 
•  All elements of service and repair are available everywhere, even if the 
more complex repairs are not naturally profitable in all outlets 
•  The full range of vehicles is made available for sale and supported with full 
service everywhere 
•  A close relationship with selected, exclusive dealers is essential to ensuring 
the range and quality of both sales and service functions 
•  A strong brand identity is vital to the manufacturer's survival and a close 
relationship with selected, exclusive dealers is essential to preserving it. 
3.2 SED onlv operates in part ofthe  sales and  seroice market 
A fundamental point to appreciate is that the SED system, although covering 
100% of new car sales in Europe, is in fact a minority phenomenon, in terms of 
overall  car  sales.  As  Exhibit 3.2.1,  shows,  the  great majority  of car  sales 
transactions concern used cars, rather than new cars.  This is no surprise, in a 
mature and essentially saturated car market.  Averaging across Europe, SED 
concerns only one-third of car sales. 
Exhibi/3.2.1 
Used  and  new car sales in Europe 
New and used car sales, 1998 
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8 Data from SMMT. Quoted in UK Competition Commission, New cars: A report on the supply 
of new motor cars in the UK. 2000. The Italian ratio is distorted by scrappage incentives 
9 3.3 Nezo car markets are [ar from uni(onn across Europe 
A second key point is that the structure of new car markets varies between 
countries. The majority of new cars are sold by franchise  dealers to private 
individuals (the "retail" sector in Exhibit 3.3.1).  But there is also a significant 
"fleet"  sector, which is  growing.  The term "fleet"  covers not only genuine 
operators of vehicle fleets  (rental companies, public administrations, service 
and utility companies' vehicles, company salespeople, etc) but also purchases 
by professional leasing and contract hire companies, on behalf of individuals, 
notably company executives and self-employed professionals. The unusually 
large fleet sector in the UK is the result of an historical anomaly in personal 
taxation, which gave a  strong incentive for  the provision of company cars. 
Even  though  the  tax  incentive  is  now  largely  gone,  the  habit  and  the 
attachment to the convenience have stuck. 
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3. 4 Growing, fleet sales weaken the sales/service link 
UK 
The relative size of the fleet market has a major effect on how cars reaching the 
end of their first cycle of ownership enter the second hand car market.  The 
greater the share of fleets in the new car market, the more strongly structured 
are the wholesale and retail markets for reselling them.  Although franchised 
dealers may be nominally involved in the sale of new cars to fleets, these cars 
often move away from the "supplying" dealer.  The sales/  service link is then 
often  broken  from  the  outset.  Even  some  new  fleet  cars  never  see  the 
dealership for service, and there is generally a heavy drop in service retention 
by dealership networks when a car enters the second hand market.  Dealers 
can choose simply to resell those used cars they receive as trade-ins against 
9 Based on ICDP research paper 10/98, Fleet and Direct Sales in Europe, plus industry 
interviews. 
10 sales of new cars, although this tends to produce a weakly-profitable used car 
business for them.  Or they can quickly dispose of unattractive trade-ins into 
the wholesale trade channels and actively stock up with saleable cars from 
those  channels,  offering  a  fuller  range  to  purchasers  suited  to  local  and 
regional tastes.  By reproducing the buy/  maintain/  exchange sequence in the 
second ownership cycle, these dealers can achieve quite high service retention 
for these vehicles and thus a good level of profitability.  There are in fact three 
car market sectors: new cars, for which sales and service are forcibly bundled 
together through the SED  system;  dealer-supplied used cars, in which the 
bundling is achieved by the dealer in a free market; and used cars from other 
sources, for which sales and service are largely disconnected (few independent 
used car traders offer directly connected service facilities). 
Exhibit  3.4.1  illustrates  this.  It  also  shows  the  differences  in  national 
propensities to have recourse to franchised dealers for service in any of the 
three car market sectors.  These  are  rooted  in long-established  traditions. 
Combined with the differences in the structures of the new car markets, this 
results in very large differences in overall retention of service business by 
dealers for the vehicles of their make in the national pare.  At one extreme, 
dealers in Germany typically achieve 65-70%  retention, those in the UK 30-
35%.  There  are  of  course  further  variations  by  brand,  with  upline  and 
Japanese makes usually achieving higher retention than volume makes. 
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3.5 There are maior structural differences between national franchise dealer networks 
As Exhibit 3.5.1  shows, there are considerable structural differences between 
the franchised networks themselves from one European country to another.  In 
the southern European countries, there are extensive networks of service-only 
sub-dealers (or agents), who may also receive a commission for introducing 
1o Autofocus: European Aftersales Market Sizing Research -1998 survey of 30,000 motorists 
11 new car customers to the main dealers.  This approach also allows greater 
concentration and higher new car throughputs for the main dealers. 
Exhibit 3.5.1 
D  ~  tw,  ic.  .  E.  ea.er ne  '011  -s tn  urope 
Country  1997 Volume Retail Market  Main  Sub  Retail Volume 
(thousand)  %  Dealers  Dealers  per Main Dealer 
Germany  3528  58%  17000  8000  120 
France  1713  69%  5000  18000  236 
Italy  2412  70%  4300  9100  393 
Netherlands  478  67%  2500  500  128 
Spain  1012  60%  3000  6300  202 
UK  2171  37%  6500  800  124 
Source: aut{R)LIS submission to House o.f  Commons Trade and  Industry 
Committee, 1998 
This responds to the need for different network densities for occasional sales of 
cars and the much more frequent performance of routine service and repair 
operations.  It therefore partly removes sales/  service link at the local level, 
while maintaining it within the national SED network. 
Exhibit 3.5.2 
Different dealer network  structures within Europe 
New sales  per main dealer &  service retention 
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When  the  annual  retail  new  car  throughputs  are  combined  with  service 
retention levels, as shown in Exhibit 3.5.2,  the dramatic difference between 
national networks emerges.  Germany has a large number of dealers, selling 
relatively  few  new  cars  per  outlet.  By  achieving  high  service  retention, 
however,  they  are  able  to  survive  financially.  UK  dealers,  who  have 
sometimes been portrayed as exceptionally large and powerful 11  are in fact 
doubly disadvantaged by the large share of fleet sales and its consequence of 
poor service retention.  The southern European approach may in fact be the 
11 See, for example, "Winning tomorrow's customers", ICDP 
12 better  compromise.  Again,  it  achieves  coverage  of  rural  areas  with low 
population density by accepting a partial weakening of the local sales/  service 
link. 
3. 6 Franchised dealers are (qr from the onlv serious providers o(seroice 
It is  also  very important to  understand that good maintenance and repair 
service  is  not  the  exclusive  province  of  the  franchise  dealer  sector.  The 
industry frequently states that dealers alone can offer the full range of services, 
while conceding that fast fit  specialists can work on simple tasks,  such as 
changing tyres and exhausts cost-effectively. 
•  We  are  not capturing  data  for  independent  repairers.  We  would,  however,  expect 
independent repair outlets to focus their work on light maintenance jobs like oil &  filter 
changes (i.e. not the full routine maintenance in line with our recommendations as defined 
for each vehicle derivative), light repairs and a limited range of collision and glass repairs. 
The above repair jobs would only require limited technical skills and training. In general, 
no special equipment will be required to carry out these less complex repair jobs. ( Vehicle 
Manttfocturer) 12 
Reality is more complex than this "it's us or nothing" portrayal.  This is in fact 
also conceded even by dealers, who seem to take an interestingly different 
stance in their submissions from the one they adopt in public: 
•  The  quality  of work performed  shows no  difference  between franchised  garages  and 
independent workshops. (They) Like franchised garages are specialising in some makes, 
independent garages are more and more concentrating either on the  maintenance and 
repair of a small number of makes, or on some specific jobs like brakes, shock absorbers, 
exhaust and body repair.  Independent workshops cannot run unless their work is carried 
out by  specialised  well-equipped  and  trained  persons.  In  some  countries  there  are 
differences  between  dealers  and  independent  repairer  relating  to  the  ability  of 
independent  repairers  to  compete  with  dealers  due  to  lack  of  access  to  technical 
information on the one hand and warranty work on the other hand.  Warranty work is 
mostly carried out by franchised dealers.  Most consumers cannot appreciate if a repair job 
is  complicated or not, or has been done properly or not and they often prefer to  pay a 
higher  price  to  the  franchised  dealer  because  of  the  support  given  by  the  vehicle 
manufacturer.  Another point is  the  publicity  given  to  the  existence  of  the  franchise 
networks  by  the manufacturer  I importer of the  make,  which has a  great influence on 
customers to the detriment of independent garages.  CECRA  (B) (12) 
•  "It is  not possible  to  identify  quality differences  between franchised  and  independent 
workshops, within the scope of their normal service offerings. This is  attributable to the 
German legal requirement that every workshop be managed by a  qualified automotive 
master mechanic. This requires 3.5 years training as an automotive mechanic or electrician, 
plus at least 1  year's experience.  It ensures that only competent workshops carry out 
service  and  repair.  Independent  workshops  need  the  same  technical  equipment  as 
franchised workshops. The make - or model - specific element of special tools amounts to 
15-35% of total investment, depending on the size and nature of the workshop (higher for 
commercial vehicles and body repair).  Excluding technical training, workshop investment 
is  about DM300,000,  of  which 20%  is  product-specific.  Some  low-volume specialised 
repair  is  sub-contracted,  e.g.  paint,  air  conditioning,  injection  pumps.  There  is  an 
increasing tendency for vehicle manufacturers to shift responsibility for investment onto 
12 Responses To European Commission questionnaire, August 2000.  All further quotations in 
this document taken from the responses are identified by (12). 
13 the dealers, notably with respect to charging for training.  The ZDK has set up a DIN-EN-
ISO  9000  accreditation  scheme  applicable  to  both  franchised  dealer  workshops  (31% 
penetration so far) and independents (5% penetration)" ZDK  (D)(12) 
•  "Vehicle  manufacturers  strongly  support  quality  assurance  procedures  in  dealer 
workshops,  including  ISO  9002  certification.  Nothing  similar  has  yet  happened  for 
independent workshops,  other  than  in  the  body  repair sector,  through  the  insurance 
companies. About 50%  of bodyshops are in the franchised sector and 50%  independent. 
There are some problems for the independents of access to diagnostic equipment reserved 
for the franchised sector" GNCR (F) (12) 
•  "In the first 8 months of 2000,  we received 140 complaints about repairs (64  relating to 
franchised dealers, 65 to independent garages, 11 to fast fitters)" ANWB (NL)) (12) 
Exhibit 3.6.1  summarises the structures of service and parts aftermarkets in 
Europe.  The three main sectors appear in all national aftermarkets, although 
repair 
retailing 
Source: aut{K)LIS 
Exhibit 3. 6.1 
European aftermarket structures 
in very different proportions: 
•  The  OES  (Original  Equipment  Spares)  sector  contains  the  channels 
organised  and  managed  by  the  vehicle  manufacturers,  through  their 
franchise dealers.  Its strengths are the brand associations with the vehicle 
manufacturers, tightly organised logistics and full  availability of service 
and parts ranges within each brand.  Its weaknesses are the duplication of 
networks, caused by brand exclusivity, and the high service prices charged 
to consumers as a result of the underlying cross-subsidies 
•  IAM-T  (Independent  Aftermarket,  Traditional)  is  the  sector  in  which 
independent  repair  garages  service  and  repair  cars,  supported  by 
independent  parts  distributors.  Contrary  to  vehicle  manufacturers' 
statements, this sector is not simply limited to routine tasks. It supports a 
large  proportion  of  the  vehicle  pare and  tries  to  offer  a  full  range  of 
services, although this is becoming more difficult within the sector, because 
of  the  growing  role  of  on-board  electronic  control  systems  and  of 
14 diagnostics equipment (see Section 4).  Its strengths are: independence of 
vehicle  brand, local  presence and entrepreneurship, and flexibility.  Its 
weaknesses  are:  internal  fragmentation,  excessive  complexity  in  the 
logistics  chains,  and  problems  with  access  to  systems  and  diagnostic 
technologies kept proprietary by the vehicle manufacturers 
•  The IAM-ND (Independent Aftermarket, New Distribution) sector covers 
the  large-scale  chained  and  branded  independent  service,  repair  and 
retailing networks, which offer  narrow ranges of simplified  services  in 
specialised outlets with a more flexible response and lower costs than the 
traditional  channels  (OES  and lAM-T).  They  have  made  considerable 
inroads, within limited ranges of service, although to different degrees in 
different national markets. Characteristic examples in the Fast Fit category 
are the tyre service  outlets of the major tyre companies and the major 
independent chains, such as Midas or KwikFit Euro/Speedy (both of which 
have partly achieved Europe-wide penetration), or Autoglass-Carglass in 
glass  repair  (which  is  virtually  pan-European).  There  are  major 
independent  parts  and  accessories  retailing  chains,  which  also  often 
provide  service  bays  for  fast  fit  and  current  maintenance  and  repair. 
Leading examples are Norauto (France, Spain, Belgium), ATU (300 outlets 
throughout Germany) and Halfords (UK).  These ND players are very large 
organisations,  with  strong  brand  images  of  their  own.  Vehicle 
manufacturers have tried to reproduce fast fit formats within their dealer 
service networks but with only limited success - the two businesses are too 
different,  in  terms  of  customer  groups  addressed,  premises  and  staff 
resources  required,  and  management  approaches.  The  acquisition  of 
KwikFit by Ford and of Midas by Magneti Marelli (Fiat Group) come over 
almost as admissions of failure 
•  In addition, technical specialists back up the generalist workshops of both 
the  OES  and lAM sectors,  for  work requiring equipment and training 
beyond their means.  Characteristic examples of these are diesel injection 
specialists,  engine  rebuilders  and  bodywork  repairers,  and  new  and 
growing groups of air-conditioning specialists. 
•  "Recourse to outside specialists: 
1.  Engine: 100% of engine rebuild, 60% of cylinder head rebuild 
2.  Diesel: 100% of repair of pumps and injectors 
3.  Fuel injection: 60% of clean and check injectors, 100% of ECU repair 
4.  Steering: 90% of repair of power steering, 100% for steering pump, 90% for 
steering box 
5.  Air conditioning: 100% for repair and cleaning 
6.  Glass: 100% for laminated pieces 
7.  Brakes: 100% of mastervac repair 
8.  CV joints: 100% of remanufacturing 
9.  Automatic and manual gearboxes: 100% of remanufacturing" 
RACC  (£)(12) 
•  This long-standing phenomenon is  a  challenge to the vehicle industry's 
assertion that only the SED  system can provide the full  range of high-
technology services.  An increasing proportion of the technological content 
15 of modern vehicles  comes from  the systems and components industry, 
whose members supply systems and components to a  range of vehicle 
manufacturers. 
3. 7 For older cars, consumers desert the franchise networks and  the soles/semice !Jizk 
The older the car gets, the more likely its owner is to purchase service and 
parts from independent providers.  Exhibit 3.7.1 shows data for the split of 
Exhibit 3. 7.1 
Shore o(semice spend bv  source of  vehicle 
Share of spend by outlet vs source of vehicle 
120%-.---------------------., 
New from FD  Used from FD  Used -Independent 
Source: Polk Automotive Intelligence (op.  cit.) 
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service spend, for the top five markets in Europe (Germany, France, Italy, UK 
and Spain).  OES service retention is highest for new cars but equally high for 
used cars sourced from a franchised dealer- in both cases, it is possible for the 
dealer to maintain the sale/  service/  exchange cycle.  When the car comes from 
an independent source, however, the link collapses.  There are, however, huge 
variations in these structures from country to country- with the highest OES 
shares in the first two columns being achieved in Germany and the lowest in 
Italy. 
Exhibit 3.7.2 shows dealer service retention profiles for Germany and Italy. 
Even in Germany, where franchise dealer service retention is probably higher 
than anywhere else in the world, there is a perceptible fall-off in loyalty after 
the first ownership cycle.  In Italy, at the other extreme, the franchise networks 
never even capture half the market from the beginning of the vehicle's life. 
The UK lies somewhere in the middle, with high loyalty during the  new car 
ownership cycle (largely dominated by corporate ownership) but a steep fall-
off thereafter (Exhibit 3.7.3),  because fleet vehicles entering the second-hand 
car market are mainly cut off from their supplying dealers. 
16 Erhibit 3.7.2 
Dealer service retention bv  age o(vehicle 
Dealer Service Retention by Age of Car- New and Used 
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Exhibit 3. 7.3 
UK  service retention bvage o(velucle 
El Fast Fit 
Centre 
DMobilc 
Mechanic 
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Service 
Total 
Type of outlet used by age of  car 
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years  years 
Base:  8 70  24 2  17 5  415  691 
All who used a garage/professional for service/repairs in the last 6 months 
Source: T.N Harris surveyi3 
Repair 
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years  years 
106  127  458 
Drivers of older vehicles are also less likely to adhere to fixed interval service 
schedules.  Exhibit 3.7.4  shows some Swedish survey data, which reveals a 
dramatic drop in adherence once the vehicle passes the 5-year mark, i.e. when 
it enters the second-hand car sector.  Again, this reflects  a  flight from  the 
dealer at this stage in the vehicle's life.  Sweden has a relatively old pare of 
vehicles in use. Swedish drivers apparently manage to keep their vehicles on 
the road a long time, without recourse to the franchise networks - this in a 
country with very high safety standards.  The greatly improved quality of 
vehicles and components has clearly helped in this. 
13 in: Office of Fair Trading, Car Servicing and Repair, August 2000 
17 100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Exhtbit 3. 7. 4 
Swedish compliance with service schedules 
Sweden '9 5  -S e rv icing according to  s c he  d u Je 
New  3-5 yrs  6-8 yrs  9-16yrs 
vehicle age 
llii!IIEntirely/ Mainly •occasionally /Not at all 
Source: /CDP survey14 /  outt7iDus calculations 
3.8 The unregulated independent sector is as Iorge as the franchise sector 
The shares of the three main sectors within different national aftermarkets 
(based on parts flows) is shown in Exhibit 3.8.1, overleaf.  At the one extreme, 
Germany is strongly OES-dominated, while the lAM is much stronger in the 
UK. On average across Europe, half the aftermarket is OES and half is lAM. 
The ND formats have achieved considerable penetration in France and the UK 
but not elsewhere yet.  This split at the aggregate level  (all  parts moving 
through channels) is the reflection of consumers' choice of service and retail 
outlets. 
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14 Research Paper 6/98, Impact of technology, quality and reliability on aftersales operations 
1s Excluding tyres and lubricants 
18 This is  also true at the level of specific jobs, as shown for one of the most 
common (and safety-related, although simple)  service jobs,  changing brake 
pads, in Exhibit 3.8.2.  Again, this demonstrates that the market split is not 
simply between OES  and ND.  Traditional independent service and repair 
garages in the IAM-T sector still command a large market share. 
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3.9 Highlv technical repairs are not dominated bv the OES  sector 
The technical specialist service and repair sectors are by no means wholly tied 
to vehicle sales. The two major diesel service networks have always operated 
under the Bosch and Lucas (now Delphi) brands, these being the two leading 
suppliers of diesel injection systems. These are major independent systems and 
components  supply  groups,  which  serve  multiple  vehicle  manufacturer 
customers. Radiator suppliers, such as Valeo, Behr and Serck-Marston have 
long operated all-makes specialist service networks, now extending into the 
growing market for air-conditioning maintenance and repair. 
Exhibd 3. 9.1 
OES  and  JAM  bodl(Shops 
Bodyshop populations 
Source: auf{7?()LIS/ based on data ftom the Association lnfernafionale des 
Riparateurs en Carrossene (AIR  C) 
19 Body repair is a major technical activity, involving substantial investments in 
equipment  and  training.  Yet  the  bodyshop  profession  is  numerically 
dominated by independent shops (see Exhibit 3.9.1). 
•  "70%  of bodywork repairs are conducted by independent bodyshops. 1050  of the total 
1500 all-makes bodyshops are independent, 450 belonging to franchised dealers. There are 
some problems with equipment only being available to  the franchised  sector.  Of the 1 
million repair jobs per year, 50% involve manufacturers' warranties" FOCWA (NL)(12) 
•  "Although half or more of these are on vehicles that are within the warranty period, 75% 
are actually performed by independent shops. Nevertheless, the manufacturers, each in 
their own way, try to get owners to commit to the dealership. They issue repair insurance 
policies, which require return to  the dealership, at non-economic prices. There are threats 
of  warranty  invalidation  if  work is  conducted  in  non-franchised  shops.  The  work  of 
independent body shops is denigrated to customers who have made use of them, although 
most of our affiliated shops use fully  trained personnel and OE  parts. Two certification 
systems are in operation: Eurogarant, an all-makes warranty, and ISO 9002"  - Febelcar (B) 
(12) 
While some of the larger bodyshops are dealer-controlled, the independents 
are able  to  obtain both vehicle  manufacturer and  insurer approvals.  The 
physical and training investments required for body repair is  generally not 
specific to vehicle makes or models.  There are, however, some links where 
mechanical or electrical/  electronic re-assembly is required.  There also appears 
to be  a  distortion of parts supply into the bodyshops, with OES channels 
dominating, particularly through vehicle manufacturers' hold on the supply of 
bodyparts (Exhibit 3.9.2). 
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20 One key difference between the bodyshop sector and the rest of the vehicle 
repair sector is the nature of the customer.  Insurance companies pay for the 
majority of body repairs, which makes the insurance company, not the vehicle 
user,  the  buyer  of  services.  Insurance  companies  will  usually  direct  the 
customer to their own approved, local body repairer- regardless of whether 
this is an independent or a franchised outlet.  They can exercise considerable 
purchasing leverage, unlike individual retail customers. 
3.10 In the US,  the sa/es/seroice link is extremelv weak 
The vehicle industry claims that the US  approach to automotive sales and 
service is similar to that used in Europe.  The only difference is supposed to be 
that the  US  is  a  single  market,  with little  government interference,  while 
Europe is a fragmented set of national markets with interference.  "A system 
that works perfectly well in the US is controversial in the EU.  The reason is 
not the system but the context in which it works: the EU" 17 
The US SED system is  held in place by tough dealership laws.  These have 
been separately negotiated in each state of the Union and vary from one state 
to another. Attachment to states' rights is strong in the US.  This makes these 
laws extremely difficult to attack in aggregate.  They were originally instituted 
to  protect  consumers  but now  in  effect  protect  dealers  against  excessive 
exercises of power by the manufacturers.  Dealers are licensed annually by 
mixed private/  public commissions in each state.  The balance of power swung 
in favour dealers in the US in the 1980s, although there has been some partial 
reversal  since.  18  Dealers as a  group are far  more powerful vis-a-vis  both 
vehicle manufacturers and legislators in the US than in Europe. 
A major difference compared to Europe is that the dealer population is far 
more concentrated. There are one-third as many dealerships as in Europe. The 
top 25  dealers sell 1.3 million new cars per year, controlling over 7%  of the 
whole market. AutoNation Inc,  the largest dealer group, sells almost half a 
million vehicles, through 290  outlets, i.e.  over 1600  per outlet.  Behind the 
shelter of the protective laws and commissions, much more concentration has 
taken place. 
As a result of the different balance of power, US dealers are less constrained in 
their commercial dealings.  They aggressively discount models in stock. The 
majority of vehicle advertising in the  US  is local  dealer advertising in the 
press,  based  on  product  and  price.  But  they  also  charge  considerable 
premiums over list price for "hot" models, which is very rare in Europe. They 
appear to achieve much better profitability on new vehicle sales than their 
European counterparts, suggesting that a more liberal regime may actually be 
healthier for dealers than a very controlled one. 
17 ACEA, position on motor vehicle distribution in the European Union (op.cit.) 
18 Dossier: la distribution automobile aux Etats-Unis, La Lettre de 1' Automobile, juillet/  a out 
2000 
21 Another  very  significant  difference  is  that  the  US  has  a  much  stronger 
independent  service  sector,  including  'do-it-yourself'  (DIY),  and  different 
attitudes of the public to car ownership and use.  In the US  definition, the 
independent aftermarket (lAM) includes both generalist and specialist repair 
shops.  Exhibit 3.10.1  illustrates the respective shares of the different outlet 
types for  'regular maintenance'  - which includes tune-ups, headlamps, air 
filters,  oil changes and batteries.  Franchise dealers retain only 40%  of this 
market, even when the vehicle is new.  Over the whole life of the vehicle, 
retention is barely 20%  Thus the world's single largest and most mature car 
market shows the most extensive disconnection between sales and service. 
Exhibit 3.1  0.1 
Routine maintenance share o(channel 
US- Outlet Share by Vehicle Age -1999 
loFr. Dealer  l'!l!IIAM  •Retail I  Vehicle Age (yrs) 
Source: Automotive Industry Statistics Report 1999, MEJVVli9 
"Regular maintenance" means in the main relatively simple jobs, which would 
explain the volume of retail,  which in the US  is  either the 'do-it-yourself' 
market, or where a customer buys the parts for someone else to install. 
Exhibit 3.10.2 
Engine maintenance share o(clzannels 
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22 One  might  expect  greater  retention  by  the  franchised  dealer  for  more 
complicated  maintenance  or  repair  jobs,  including  engine  overhauls,  fuel 
pumps, starters and transmission.  In fact,  as Exhibit 3.10.2  shows, the US 
market is extensively unbundled even for the more technical jobs. 
3.11 It is bv no means eVIdent (rom the market structures that the sales/service link is 
a whollv natural  one 
The vehicle manufacturers try to convey the impression that the only serious 
proposition is SED and the sales/  service link, with some grudging recognition 
of the New Distribution sector.  The real picture is significantly different: 
•  Averaged across countries, half of current service, repair and parts sales in 
Europe takes place in the independent aftermarket sector, including safety-
critical work 
•  By  the  manufacturers'  reasoning20  therefore  either  half of the  cars  on 
European roads  are  unsafe,  or  their  presumption that  only  franchised 
dealer workshops are competent is false 
•  By  that same logic, either half of car owners are irresponsible, or half the 
market has good reasons for  disagreeing with the  proposition that the 
vehicle manufacturers' system of the sales/  service link is  the only valid 
proposition 
•  There already is an extensive disconnection between sales and servicing of 
cars, through the existence of an lAM, as large as OES 
•  The OES sector has no monopoly of the more complex, technical repairs. 
Some of the most technical service and repair interventions are referred to 
specialist workshop networks that depend not on vehicle manufacturers 
but on specialised component suppliers. 
•  An even more pronounced disconnection is evident in the US,  for both 
routine  and  complex  servicing  and  repair.  Contrary  to  some  public 
pretensions,  vehicle  distribution  is  significantly  different  in  the  US, 
compared to Europe. 
All this suggests that the sales/  service link is not a wholly natural one, that it 
may be forced under some circumstances, and that at least some alternatives 
exist. 
20 ACEA -CECRA Press Release 251h October 2000, p.1 following a review of the functioning of 
distribution of new motor vehicles and automotive after sales services. 
23 4. There are significant forces and trends that threaten a destabilisation of the 
current system 
4.1 Car sales nozo contribute llftle to the protitab!lity o(dealerships 
Vehicle  manufacturers  regularly  collect  extensive  information  about  the 
operations and financial  performance of their  dealership networks  (the  so-
called dealer composites).  This is highly confidential information that is not in 
the  public  domain.  There  are,  however,  indications  available  about how 
important aftercare business is to dealerships.  This is illustrated in Exhibit 
4.1.1, which shows the contribution of the main departments of dealerships to 
gross profit for the business as a whole.  While there are differences between 
countries, the overall pattern is there.  The analysis is disappointing, in that it 
does not go beyond gross margins to net departmental contributions, nor to 
the financial balance of the dealership as a whole. 
Germany  35%  24%  59% 
Italy (estimate)  6%  16%  22% 
UK  44%  16%  60% 
Source: ICDP (op.  cit.) 
The  remaining gross  profit contributions in franchise  dealers  are obtained 
through sales of new and used cars, finance and insurance packages, extended 
warranty sales etc.  More detailed published figures have become available, 
through work conducted for the UK Competition Commission.  As the data is 
for a sample of UK dealers only, care must be taken not to extrapolate all the 
details  and conclusions  to  the  rest of Europe.  Nevertheless,  some  of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from Exhibit 4.1.2 are interesting. 
Exhibit 4.1.2 
Financial structure of  a dealer business 
Department 
Sales  Gross  Department  Department  Net Profit  Net Margin% of NP  Overhead 
£ mio  Profit£ mi1 Profit£ mio  Overhead £ mio £ mio  % of Sales Net Profit  %of Sales 
New cars  4.3  0.20  0.17  0.03  0.07  0.02  26% 
Used cars  3.3  0.19  0.06  0.13  -0.02  -0.01  -6% 
Car parts  0.9  0.18  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.09  28% 
Workshop and servicing  0.5  0.29  0.13  0.16  0.12  0.26  43% 
Body  shop  0.2  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.17  10% 
Forecourt  0.2  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0% 
Other  0.1  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0% 
Total  9.4  0.96  0.49  0.48  0.28  0.03  100% 
0.7% 
4.0% 
9.7% 
35.1% 
32.3% 
2.8% 
14.3% 
Source: calculated  ftom data in UK Competdion Commission report  /Nezo  Cars/~ 
200021 
21 Based on a survey of 123 UK dealers 
24 As an average across this sample of dealers, the data show that car sales (used 
and new) contribute 80%  of sales but only 40%  of the total of departmental 
gross profits (sales less the cost of goods sold); 50%  of departmental profit 
(gross  profit  less  departmental  overheads);  and  20%  of net profit for  the 
dealership  as  a  whole  (the  sum  of  departmental  profits,  less  the  central 
overhead). 
4.2 Workshops are the economic and  relationship heart o(the dealer business 
One of the most interesting set of figures in Exhibit 4.1.1 is the last column on 
the right, departmental overhead as a percentage of departmental sales.  It is 
an indication of the relative depth of investment in each of the dealership's 
sub-businesses: 
•  New car sales requires initial investment in the showroom and signage, 
although there is a trend to reduce the size and cost of showrooms.  The 
new vehicle stock is financed by the vehicle manufacturer, normally for a 
sufficient period of time for the vehicles to sell.  Staff costs are low, relative 
to  the value of sales.  Gross margins are held very low,  reducing the 
dealer's ability to discount.  The whole sub-business is in effect run by the 
vehicle manufacturer, with the help of ex-post-facto bonus payments and 
the provision of incentives to dealers and end customers, such as low-cost 
or no-cost finance and free insurance.  The dealer's main role is to round 
up customers in the allocated sales territory 
•  Used car sales require the dealer to maintain a stock of vehicles for sale-
hence the higher overhead.  This requires astute purchasing and active 
management, without which hard-to-sell trade-ins remain on the books for 
long periods and attractive vehicles are not there to draw customers.  The 
lack of profit in the sample confirms that not all dealers manage this sub-
business successfully and profitably.  This is a free and open business, open 
to competition from independent used car traders, large and small, and 
from sales between individuals 
•  The parts business requires financing an initial stock, refreshing that stock, 
and a dedicated staff, plus parts identification and communication systems. 
This business is also quite strictly controlled by the vehicle manufacturer, 
including bonuses related to parts sales, which can also be linked to and 
affect vehicle sales bonuses.  Maximising returns often means proactive 
sales into the independent aftermarket - therefore many dealers operate as 
local OES-branded distributors with a fleet of delivery vehicles. 
•  The service+ workshop and bodyshop are the most heavily invested and 
most profitable businesses.  In fact,  they are the economic heart of the 
dealership.  They are also the key to building the relationship with the 
consumer and keeping his or her loyalty to the dealership 
•  The forecourt (fuel  sales)  and other businesses (carwash,  rental,  etc)  are 
marginal profit contributors 
25 Thus the contribution to profit, reputation and brand image of parts sales, 
workshop and servicing, bodyshop and the rest greatly outweigh that from 
vehicle  sales,  with  the  proportion  having  generally  increased  over  recent 
years.  Aftermarket operations subsidise vehicle sales  (particularly  sales  of 
new  vehicles),  both  financially  and  in  building  the  relationship  with 
customers. 
4.3 Focused,  scale-driven competitors are able to attack the dealership in each o(its 
constituent businesses 
The challenge to these locally bundled sub-businesses is that each of them is 
increasingly exposed to focused, scale-driven competitors: 
•  New car sales by direct sales from vehicle manufacturers to fleets, which 
later  generate  flows  of 6-month to  3-year  old used cars back  into  the 
marketplace 
•  Used car sales by a growing breed of used car supermarkets, with a much 
greater ability to display and maintain a wide range of cars, as well as the 
traditional local independent traders 
•  Service  and  workshop  activities  by  independent  garages,  at  least  for 
routine service and repairs, offering lower labour rates (often 30%  lower), 
and by chained service specialists for the routine tasks such as tyre, exhaust 
and glass repair, which do not need qualified mechanics and fit well into 
multi-bay, service-while-you-wait outlet formats 
•  Body repair by independent bodyshops, as there is no restrictive franchise 
in this sector 
•  Other services, notably financial, by a plethora of independent agencies 
•  Technical repairs by specialists, such as diesel fuel injection workshops 
4.4 Improvements in quality continue to undennine the cross-substdv mechanism 
within dealerships 
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26 I 
The automotive industry in Europe has achieved dramatic improvements in 
the quality of vehicles and in the reliability and durability of their constituent 
systems  and  parts.  Exhibits  4.4.1  and  4.4.2  illustrate  the  impact  of  this 
achievement on the aftermarket. 
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The effect is to depress the whole of the aftermarket, at least for conventional 
mechanical and electrical  repairs,  as  Exhibit 4.4.3  shows.  Paint and body 
repairs, however, are holding up.  Even if accident rates have been falling in 
Europe, the increased complexity of body structures and thus of repairs to 
them has maintained the overall expenditure of repair hours in this sector. 
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27 Manufacturers'  recommended  service  intervals  continue  to  lengthen,  as 
Exhibit 4.4.4 shows. 
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Source: BBE-Branchenreport der Aftermarket  for  PkW-Komponente~ 1998 
These developments tend to drive the incidence of service and repair further 
into the later periods of the vehicle's life, when it is least likely to be taken to 
the franchised dealer.  This is increasingly eating into the critical profit streams 
of the franchised dealers.  Conversely, it favours the independent aftermarket, 
although prices will be severely depressed by the greater price sensitivity of 
the owners of older vehicles.  Many component suppliers and the  vehicle 
manufacturers  themselves  are  offering  second  ranges  of  shorter-life 
components to cater for the needs of this sector 
4.5 Conversell/,  the uowth o(  electronic Sl(Stems  strengthens  the  position  of the 
dealerships, relative to the JAM-T sector 
The  increasing  complexity  of  vehicles  and  the  proliferation  of  on-board 
electronic systems, required by steadily increasing standards of performance, 
comfort, safety and environmental protection, increase the opportunities for 
specialised technical service and repair.  The rate of penetration of the new 
technologies is illustrated in Exhibit 4.5.1 overleaf. 
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One aspect which remains unclear so far is the extent to which this type of 
specialist service and repair will be controlled by franchised dealers, thereby 
increasingly tying the car user to the dealer, or by independent networks, as it 
has been in the past: 
•  "Franchised dealer workshops have access  to  diagnostic systems and data that are not 
available to  the independents.  The investments required  in make- and model-specific 
tools  are  designed  by  the  manufacturers  to  drive  small  independent garages  out of 
business.  The systems and data updates alone can cost Euro 15,000- 150,000 per year. 
Mercedes-Benz updates its access codes every month.  Manufacturers have instituted a 
culture of specificity, which enables them to  monopolise the market during the first 2-3 
years of the vehicle's life.  They are trying to extend the period further.  It's impossible to 
get written proof.  The equipment and component suppliers no doubt have it but they are 
frightened of losing their OE business." EASRA (12) 
•  "The development of all  makes diagnostic equipment is  an increasingly expensive and 
difficult activity due to the proliferation of on-board electronic systems and the expanded 
functionality  of such  systems.  The  intellectual  property  rights  (notably  copyright in 
software) of such systems are usually held by the vehicle manufacturers and as such are 
not available to manufacturers of all-makes diagnostic equipment". Major Systems Supplier 
(12) 
Whatever that ultimate outcome, the new on-board technologies clearly cause 
problems for traditional independent repair garages.  The industry is full of 
stories of their conducting a service or performing a repair but then having to 
take the vehicle to the franchised dealer to get the warning light turned off -
usually for a fee.22 The vehicle industry clearly states its view that independent 
22 Interviews with independent repair garages in the context of this report, September 2000 
29 garages are being disqualified by this trend.23 There are numerous declarations 
that support it: 
•  "For example the following remark"  Ah, but!  Cars will soon be so complex that customers 
will have to come to us" was made on more than one occasion during the research, by both 
dealers and manufacturers."  /CD~  Aflersales in Europe,  1997 
•  "Independent  repairers  are  able  to  repair  all  vehicle  models,  but  costs  for  specific 
equipment for  some brands/models is  so  high that most independent garages cannot 
afford them.  Nowadays there are some models which need special diagnostic equipment 
and cannot be served at all because failures cannot be diagnosed.  Repairs of some newly 
introduced products require on-line connection to the manufacturer, which is not always 
made possible for independent repairers." CECRA (B) (12) 
•  "New  technologies,  such  as  OBD,  are  a  means  of  protecting  markets.  This  affects 
independent garages and distributors, and - above all - consumers". AK  (A) (12) 
•  The large number of systems and their specificity requires the development of a particular 
diagnostic software, so that they can be compatible with overall group standards.  This is 
written with a  specific  authoring tool  and  applied  through a  specific  communications 
electronic board.  These are covered by intellectual property rights and software licenses. 
In addition, safety- and security-related systems require a confidential configuring system. 
This  configuring  is  carried  out  by  the  group's  diagnostic  system  and  constitutes 
confidential know-how.  The group does not have diagnostic equipment that can work on 
vehicles  of other  makes.  Other things  being equal,  customers are inclined  to  entrust 
repairs to the organisation that sold the vehicle.  They feel the seller to be responsible for 
product quality  and  that they  therefore  have  more  influence  on  a  dealer  than on an 
authorised workshop, which only feels responsible for the quality of the repair itself, not of 
the product as a whole."  Vehicle manufocturer (12) 
•  "These (all makes diagnostiC) products are sold by us only to the independent aftermarket or 
to smaller vehicle manufacturers without a European dealer network.  Those customers do 
not request us to limit sales to others.  It should be noted that the vehicle manufacturers 
supply dedicated diagnostic equipment to their dealers and provide software upgrades to 
their dealers only." Major Systems Supplier. (12) 
•  "Due to the large complexity and variety of electrical control units in the various vehicles 
of the different VM it is simply impossible to develop and produce all-makes testers which 
cover the makes of all VM.  Therefore even the most sophisticated all-makes testers only 
cover a limited number of the various types of vehicles". Second  Major Systems Supplier (12) 
4. 6 Distribution and  service networks are changinz in a maior wav 
Even in a relatively traditional market such as Germany, traditional outlets are 
expected  to  continue  to  consolidate and reduce in number  (Exhibit  4.6.1 ). 
There is  no sign as  yet of the OES  sector  making significant  gains at the 
expense  of  the  IAM-T  sector  - but  this  may  be  because  most  of  the 
electronic/  diagnostic  systems  are  as  yet  on cars  not old  enough  to  have 
entered their second and later ownership cycles, and predominantly on up-line 
cars, for which loyalty to the dealer is greater in any case. 
23 ACEA, position on motor vehicle distribution in the European Union, (op.cit). 
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There are signals throughout the industry that vehicle manufacturers intend to 
restructure their distribution and service networks, consolidating sales points 
and reducing the number of them, while maintaining extensive networks of 
local service satellites.  In Germany, for example, Ford, Honda and Rover have 
issued termination notices to a  large number of dealers as they restructure 
their networks in what is viewed as Europe's most important car market.  Just 
as platform strategies preserve economies of scale in underlying components, 
while allowing the derivation from them of increasing numbers of new vehicle 
models at acceptable cost, so the sharing of "back office" facilities in the dealer 
networks allows sharpening of the "front office" brand-specific facilities.  Just 
as tiering has taken place in the upstream components industry, so there will 
be  a  more  rational  deployment  of  sales  and  service  facilities,  including 
centralisation of heavy repair operations. Investment in diagnostic systems is 
not only essential for diagnosis and fault-finding in and through the on-board 
electronic processors: it is also a wonderful way to provide each service point 
with direct access to very powerful, central, server-based capabilities. 
There are also signs of the OES distribution structures being used to attack the 
lAM parts market, through all-makes programmes - a revival of an old idea. 
Reciprocally,  vehicle  manufacturers  are  required by  Regulation 1475.95  to 
allow their dealers to purchase equivalent quality parts from the lAM sector. 
While  there  is  no  documentary  proof  of  intent  or  obstruction,  there  is 
anecdotal evidence of informal pressure brought to bear on dealers not to 
source these parts (see Section 5). 
In the face of all this, the IAM-T sector remains very dispersed, although major 
international purchasing groups are gaining increasing power and influence in 
the distribution of spare parts, led by AutoDistribution International, Temot 
31 International, Groupe Auto Union and Auto Teile Ring. The major groups all 
have  chains  of soft-franchised  independent  garages  but  these  do  not  yet 
provide networks as tightly controlled or as well equipped as those in the OES 
sector.  There  is  a  plethora  of  "concepts",  involving  independent  repair 
garages becoming appointed centres for various component suppliers.  These 
do not appear to have had a serious impact- it is hard to imagine a multi-
purpose  garage being appointed by different suppliers in all  the  different 
components  areas.  Thus  the  sector  still  calls  out  for  consolidation, 
rationalisation and general improvement of performance - but under whose 
leadership ? 
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There is a  constant undercurrent of fear in the IAM-T sector that it will be 
crushed between the OES and ND sectors, if it does not restructure itself.  24 
The components industry is extremely concerned at the risk of losing access to 
the OES sector and of that sector launching a  general assault on the IAM-T 
markets. 25  But it is virtually impossible to obtain public testimony on these 
issues,  because  of the nature of suppliers'  relationships  with their  vehicle 
manufacturer customers. 
Conversely, a continued rapid expansion of the New Distribution formats is 
expected (Exhibit 4.6.2).  While the penetration of these is already high in the 
UK  and  France  (and  possibly  reaching  its  limits  there),  it is  now  clearly 
underway in Germany, which was a latecomer to the sector, has started in 
Spain and is in its infancy in Italy.  While there is little room for these formats 
to widen the scope of their operations, as only a limited set of interventions 
lend themselves to their approach, there is plenty of room for  geographical 
24 Source: confidential client survey of component suppliers' opinions, July 1999 
25 Source: ,qu/a>ous client assignments; submissions from independent aftermarket federations 
and component suppliers, August 2000 (12) 
32 extension.  The ND sector is in general concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of financially powerful players, who can strongly brand their chains 
and exercise considerable purchasing power in sourcing spare parts. 
4.7  The Internet movbe less controllable than the vehicle industry likes to think 
The vehicle industry's position so far has been that the Internet creates huge 
cost saving opportunities, both in B2B relationships with suppliers and in B2C 
relationships with customers.  26  In B2C,  the hope is  to use the Internet to 
support a generalised move away from selling completed vehicles from stock 
to  assembling vehicles  only to real end customer order, with considerable 
benefits to the running of the whole supply chain.  But the stated intention is 
not to eliminate the dealer from the sales process through direct ordering by 
retail customers. 
The Internet facilitates comparisons of products and prices, although vehicle 
manufacturers have not yet allowed actual purchasing of new cars through it. 
At present, therefore, the Internet acts only as an additional shop front into the 
franchise  dealer  system for  new  vehicles.  £-commerce  ventures,  such  as 
JamJar,  Virgin  and OneSwoop,  in fact  have  to  source  new  vehicles  from 
franchised dealers.  Their business is in fact the old one of an intermediary 
acting  on behalf  of end  customers,  arbitraging  price  differences  between 
national markets  (mostly  the UK  versus continental Europe),  with a  more 
modern user interface. The situation in the US is not fundamentally different, 
with vehicle  manufacturers  and  dealer  associations  fighting  incursions by 
would-be 3rd  party distributors, whether based one-commerce or not. Mary-
Ann Keller's resignation from a leading e-commerce enterprise in the US, on 
the grounds that Internet-based sales of new cars are not taking place to a 
significant degree and may never do so,  is  an interesting indication of the 
realities of B2C in car retailing.27 
For the moment, therefore, the impact of the Internet remains limited.  The 
principal external braking factors are:  general lack of familiarity with B2C e-
commerce in Europe;  concerns about the security of the Internet for  large 
purchases; variable rates of PC penetration, lower on average across Europe 
than in the US;  and attachment to the habit of seeing and trying out the 
product.  Behind  this  stand  the  more  fundamental  barriers  of  vehicle 
manufacturers'  and  dealers'  resistance  to  direct  ordering,  by-passing  the 
dealer, and the much deeper threat which the Internet carries of unbundling 
the whole distribution system. 
This  is  clearly  identified by Evans  and Wurster  of  the  Boston  Consulting 
Group, who view the Internet as a powerful dissolver of the glues that hold 
together bundled businesses, and who are sceptical about the future of the 
26 ACEA, reference 1 footnote 1 page 5 
27 Wall Street Journal, 7th November 2000 
33 dealer system.28  It would certainly be interesting to see large purchasers of 
vehicles,  such  as  the  short-term  rental  fleets,  large  utility  companies,  or 
government  bodies  conduct  B2B  Internet  procurement  auctions,  thereby 
emulating the vehicle manufacturers'  actions in parts sourcing.  For  retail 
customers, the movement could well first gather momentum in the second-
hand car sector and in the retailing of pre-registered vehicles, which do not 
have  to  be  retailed  through  franchised  dealers.  The  whole  e-commerce 
phenomenon could prove to be far less controllable than the vehicle industry 
imagines. 
4.8 An overall assessment 
Yesterday's  framework  is  not  automatically  the  best  for  tomorrow's 
circumstances: 
•  20 years ago, we lived in an era in which vehicles were indeed unreliable 
and  potentially  dangerous  because  of  failures  caused  by  inferior 
maintenance  and  repair.  The  concerns  of  that  era  were  reflected  in 
Regulation 123.85, which first formally exempted the vehicle industry and 
its franchised networks from the common restrictions on vertical links 
•  Thanks to  the great improvements in quality, reliability and durability, 
consumers became more used to dealing with unbundled sales and service 
propositions- as they have in other sectors.  The independent aftermarket 
has flourished under these conditions, notably its ND sector 
•  Regulation 1475.95,  however, appears virtually  to  have reproduced  the 
assumptions  about  the  unquestioned  need  for  SED,  with  only  minor 
concessions to opening up the market 
•  We  are  now  into  the  early  stages  of  a  new cycle,  in which  on-board 
electronics have introduced new complexities and new diagnostic  tools 
into the service market.  The vehicle industry appears intent upon using 
them to build proprietary barriers to entry, which will reduce the role of 
the IAM-T sector.  It is in general seeking to tighten its control over sales 
and service in its franchise channels 
The "natural" sales/  service link in particular requires closer examination. 
28 "Blown to Bits", P. Evans and T.S. Wurster, Harvard Business School Press, 2000 
34 5. The sales/service link needs closer examination 
51  The  sales/service  link  needs  to  be  reviewed against  the  whole  spectrum  of 
distribution activities 
In order to understand fully the nature of the link between sales and service, it 
is necessary to identify all the activities which impact upon it and are affected 
by it.  At first sight, some of these may not seem to have a bearing on the sales-
service link.  They do, however, have an important indirect influence on it, 
because  they  are  part  of  a  complex  set  of  linkages  which  underpin  the 
functioning of the current distribution and service system. They also illustrate 
the culture of command-and-control of which the sales-service link is part. 
We examine the following stages in the ownership cycle: 
•  Search and selection: how customers obtain information about products, 
prices and availability, in order to preselect the products they are interested 
in; bundling of benefits, in products and services; how they are able to test 
drive vehicles; and how they make their selection 
•  Negotiation and ordering: who has what power and stands on whose side 
•  The ownership cycle: PDI and handover; warranty claims and other service 
and repair; recalls; trade-ins and scrappage 
A  useful comparison is  the nearest approximation in this  sector to a  'free' 
market - the sales and servicing of used cars - and where appropriate we draw 
comparisons between the new and used car markets. 
5.2 Search and selection in new vehicles is not made more open b1( the sales/service 
link 
52.1 Product evaluation is mainly an open information market but service evaluation 
is d(!jicult 
There is an open market in information about the characteristics of vehicles, 
through the various media.  The Internet reinforces it further.  Conversely, the 
role of the franchise network as a source of information for evaluation may 
actually be declining.  "As a  provider of unbiased product information, its 
value added is  negative"29  The  selective  and exclusive  distribution system 
militates against dealer new car salespeople providing unbiased comparisons 
of products to benefit the consumer. 
Conversely, there is a major gap in information about the service side of the 
ownership experience.  There is no 'Guide Michelin' for service and repair in 
Europe.  Public comparative information about product quality and safety and 
about the cost and quality of service and repair has historically been extremely 
limited.  In the US, JD Power have for many years surveyed the US vehicle 
29 Evans and Wurster, op. cit. 
35 market in terms of the ownership experience of vehicles.  The survey does not 
look solely at the product, but also compares the aftersales experiences offered 
by the franchise networks.  In general, the owners of volume manufacturers' 
cars  fare  far  worse  than  the  niche,  specialists  or  upline  producers  in  all 
respects.  Such has become the power and acceptability of this annual survey, 
that the organisation has introduced a 'Retail Certification' programme, which 
accredits  dealers  who  meet  certain  service  quality  standards.  Public 
comparative data of this kind is hard to find in Europe.  The fragmentation 
into  national  markets  does  not  help.  Vehicle  manufacturers  conduct  co-
operative comparative surveys but the results are kept private. 
The sales/  service link brings few benefits to consumers with respect to buying 
cars and none with respect to freedom of choice in service 
5.2.2 Control over new car transaction prices is indirectly  .foctlifated  by the link 
The  UK  Competition Commission's investigation  30  clearly  identified  how 
vehicle manufacturers use their control over dealers within SED  to control 
transaction prices for retail customers.  Dealer margins have been reduced, in 
order  to  lessen  their  ability  to  grant  discounts  independently  of  the 
manufacturer.  Consumers' ability to shop around on price within a  brand 
(intra-brand competition) will clearly be further reduced by the granting of 
exclusivity within enlarged dealer territories ("market areas"). 
In  the  US  pricing  information  is  more  open  - although  there  are  some 
individual states which protect dealers' exclusive advertising territories.  US 
dealers have significantly greater commercial freedom than their European 
counterparts. They are less dependent on financial cross-subsidy of car sales 
by service and repair. They constantly advertise price deals in the local media. 
Use of the Internet for price shopping is more developed in the US, which has 
more of a national market than Europe.  Another critical difference between 
Europe and the US is the access to information on the manufacturers' invoice 
prices to dealers, plus their incentives and vehicle finance, through Internet 
sites such as Edmunds.com.  This allows consumers to estimate the dealer's 
potential  profit  on  a  vehicle,  and  hence  their  room  for  manoeuvre  in 
negotiating. 
Another  key  area  of  obscurity  in  pncmg  information  is  the  practice  of 
bundling  of  'benefits'  - free  or  low  cost  finance,  insurance,  extended 
warranties, and free servicing packages.  'Special edition' models are a further 
device for obscuring the price of the base vehicle and of options. 
The  non-transparency  of  new  car  pricing  is  not  itself  a  result  of  the 
sales/  service link.  But the practice of transaction price control on new car 
sales through very low dealer gross margins is clearly enabled by the internal 
30 Op.cit.. Despite its UK focus, the Commission's detailed and thorough report should be 
required reading for all those concerned with automotive distribution issues. 
36 cross-subsidy  within  dealerships,  which  is  itself  made  possible  by  the 
sales  I service link. 
52.3 The link does nothing to support  .freedom oj  choice in new car outlets 
Under SED, there is no choice of source of new cars for retail customers.  The 
franchised network is the only set of approved retail outlets.  Shopping around 
within the  network  within  a  country  is  being made  more  difficult.  The 
theoretical  right  to  shop in another  country,  under  1475.95,  is  hopelessly 
inconvenient for all but a tiny minority of consumers.  It has also been widely 
obstructed  in  practice.  £-commerce  intermediaries  have  to  source  from 
franchised dealers in other countries.  The industry is keeping a very tight rein 
on this  phenomenon.  Would-be new  entrants  such  as  mass  retailers  are 
equally constrained. 
For used vehicle purchasers, the market is more open.  Most used car dealers 
are multi-marque, allowing interbrand comparisons and considerably more 
choice  of vendor  within  a  local  geographic  area,  facilitating  the  sourcing 
process. 
The non-availability of truly competing outlets in sourcing new vehicles is 
forced  by the vehicle  manufacturers.  It is  emphatically not the  result of 
natural market forces.  Other than the fact that franchise dealers are obliged to 
have service facilities, there is no correlation with the sales/  service link. 
52.4 Test dnves are being separated  .from the seroice location 
Test drives are presently only available through the franchise  network, as 
dealers  have  demonstration  vehicles  for  this  purpose.  The  vehicle 
manufacturers themselves are looking to alternative methods of facilitating 
test drives, as they restructure their dealer networks to cut out cost.  Some 
have proposed having a  limited set of demonstration centres in populated 
areas, in order to centralise the test drive process.  This further weakens the 
link between sales and service.  The growth of the fleet market in Europe has 
also been working against the dealer in this respect.  Drivers of executive cars 
(who  are  not the  economic  purchasers  of vehicles)  are  increasingly  using 
dealerships to test drive vehicles at a  location convenient to them.  Rental 
companies  in  effect  offer  test  drives  of  different  vehicles  and  brands  to 
business travellers. 
As test drives are purely an aspect of sales promotion, there is no relationship 
between test drives and the linking of sales and service. 
37 5.2.5 Nezo car selection is still  heavily influenced by producer push/ zohich is indirectly 
_foalitated by the link 
Selection is highly biased by producer push, i.e.  the need to keep factories 
producing to pre-determined schedules.  Vehicles are allocated to dealers to 
sell, rather than chosen by dealers.  Full range forcing across the product range 
(the contractual obligation to sell all of the product line) is a standard part of 
this process.  Vehicle manufacturers use their power to require dealers to take 
less attractive models along with the more desirable ones.  The supply of the 
popular products is made contingent on acceptance of the less popular.  The 
dealer then has to try to force the selection into the local market.  In spite of 
overcapacity, evidence given at the UK Competition Commission enquiry 31 
suggested that at least 23% of consumers do not get their first choice of vehicle. 
Instead, they are encouraged to buy what the franchise dealer has in stock, i.e. 
the vehicles that have been allocated to the franchise dealer by the producer. 
The industry is attempting to move to building cars to customer order only. 
Time will tell how well this will work, with factories no longer shielded from 
real demand by a compliant dealer channel. 
The relationship to the sales/  service link is an indirect one.  The internal cross-
subsidy  may  enable  dealers  to  continue  manufacturer-financed  full  range 
forcing and the stocking of slow movers.  The dealer is not required to act as a 
viable independent business in new car sales.  This places the dealership firmly 
on the side of the supplier, not of the consumer. 
In the used car market, customers can select from a wider variety of vehicles, 
and used car traders will usually stock vehicles they believe to be appropriate 
to customer tastes in the local market area.  They will 'trade on' to other 
dealers or through auctions those vehicles they do not believe they can readily 
sell.  The need to bundle additional packages to the product, in order to make 
it attractive, is also not such an imperative for the used car dealer- who is free 
to determine his/her own business with or without service facilities. 
5.3 Negotiation is also highlv constrained for the retatl customer and  the dealer 
Retail customers for new cars have no option but to buy from the franchised 
dealer.  They therefore have only limited latitude in negotiation, which is often 
obscured by trade-in values and other bundled-in benefits.  The  franchise 
dealer has limited ability to negotiate with the private buyer, because of the 
small gross margins granted by vehicle manufacturers on new car sales.  There 
is no opportunity to negotiate the terms of aftersales service. 
In the fleet business, the franchise dealer is further disadvantaged when the 
negotiations take place directly between the fleet  operator and the vehicle 
manufacturers.  Under  these  circumstances,  dealers  effectively  enter  an 
'auction' to become the supplying dealer- or are appointed as specialist fleet 
31 • Op.cit. 
38 dealers  by  the  vehicle  manufacturer.  One  reward  for  the  dealer  is  the 
retrospective bonus given by the suppliers for  achieving sales targets.  The 
other  is  the  promise  of  guaranteed  service  revenues  from  fleet  owners. 
However, these are subject to negotiation on price,  to  outsourcing to third 
parties, or to the vehicle simply disappearing into another territory. 
Thus the retail buyer negotiates on car price and accepts the service offering. 
The retail buyer is given no opportunity to break open the sales/  service link 
by  negotiating  on service.  The  fleet  buyer  can  explicitly  negotiate  both, 
thereby breaking the link (notably through threatening to take service business 
elsewhere).  The second hand car customer may go through a similar process 
to the new customer when buying from a franchise dealer but also has the 
option to go to the independent sector. 
5.4. Finance is frequentlv used  as a means ofiocking sales and  service together 
Selling finance and insurance packages (on new or used vehicles)  is  a  key 
method for dealers' new car sales departments to gain revenue to offset the 
small margins on new car sales.  It is also a means by which the customer can 
be retained within the network for service. 
All vehicle manufacturers have branded finance  packages available for end 
customers to facilitate the purchase of new vehicles.  Franchise dealers are not 
free to source alternative forms of finance for the customer (unless the captive 
finance  company  does not wish cover  the  risk  on a  particular  customer). 
Customers who arrange their own finance are in many ways less attractive: 
they  have  more  negotiating  ability  and  present  fewer  additional  profit 
opportunities with which to support the dealer's small new car margin. 
The obligation to have vehicles serviced in the dealer network is explicit, when 
lease or contract hire packages are provided by the dealer.  When they are 
provided  by  independent  third  parties,  the  lock-in  becomes  part  of  the 
negotiation on prices and conditions for  the sale of vehicles to those third 
parties.  A general expectation is created that service and repair by a franchise 
dealer will enhance residual values, thereby drawing the customer into the 
franchise sector for aftersales. 
In the used vehicle market, finance packages are also available from the dealer, 
but without the necessary tie into the aftercare network.  Consumers are more 
used to unbundling of products and services in the used car market.  They will 
in many cases make independent finance arrangements to pay for the vehicle. 
This is clearly another forcing of the link by vehicle manufacturers, inhibiting 
true transparency and freedom of choice for the consumer. 
39 5.5  Insurance appears to be independent o(the sales/seroice link 
Insurance provision is a profit opportunity for both new and used dealers, as 
previously discussed in the effects of bundling.  There is usually nothing in 
insurance which ties the customer to the vehicle seller for service. 
5.6 The sale o(extended warranties props up the sales/seroice link 
Consumers are greatly reassured by the provision of warranty on high-value 
items.  All  new  vehicles  sold  in  the  European  Union  through  authorised 
dealers have a  manufacturer's warranty.  In general this is for  one year for 
European  and  US  manufacturers.  In  some  countries,  as  an  additional 
marketing tool, manufacturers will extend the warranty to three years (this 
appears  most  prevalent  in  the  UK  and  Swedish  markets).  Japanese 
manufacturers routinely cover vehicles with a  three-year warranty in all EC 
countries, with Toyota extending this to six years in Greece.  Interestingly, 
their service retention is also higher.  Most manufacturers also make provision 
for  "goodwill",  which  is  rectification  of  potentially  embarrassing  defects 
arising outside the warranty period. 
As in other consumer goods sectors, dealers (of new or used vehicles) can sell 
extended warranty insurance to purchasers (coverage beyond the normal one-
year manufacturer-financed warranty period).  Despite industry folk-wisdom 
that claims are increasing, there is no real evidence for this, except for specific 
temporary problems.  The great majority of claims arise during the first year of 
the new vehicle's life and the normal warranty system appears to be efficient 
in detecting and remedying these problems.  There is  a  sharp drop-off in 
warranty  claims  thereafter.  The  reduced  probability  of  encountering  a 
problem over the extended time period is  not explained to the customer. 
Extended warranties  on new  vehicles  therefore  provide  a  lucrative  profit 
opportunity for dealers in both sales and service.  It is common knowledge 
that dealers can earn 30%  gross profit on the sale of warranties (sales staff are 
incentivised to sell them), and the consumer may also be more inclined to use 
the dealer's workshop for service during the extended warranty period.  There 
is  usually  no  incentive  given  to  the  consumer  to  look  around  for  an 
independent source of warranty insurance. 
In the used car sector, warranties are offered which do not require the vehicle 
to be serviced by a particular outlet- although they do require a competent 
repairer carry out the  task.  These  warranties  are  provided by  insurance 
companies,  and  will  cover all  makes  and  models  of vehicle  (of  a  certain 
standard) and have national coverage - allowing the consumer more choice. 
Warranty providers, i.e. insurance companies, may also accredit certain repair 
outlets- franchise and non-franchise- that have the requisite facilities. 
When a repair under warranty is required, the most important element to the 
consumer is the first-time rectification of the fault.  In this sense it is natural for 
40 the owner to seek repair and redress through the  authorised agent of the 
producer, or in the used car market, the authorised agent of the warranty 
provider. 
With new vehicles, unlike new appliances or equipment, there is in effect less 
consumer choice of the outlet to which to return the vehicle for repair, and 
extended warranties exacerbate this effect. 
The warranty system as a whole is clearly used as part of forcing the sales 
/service link. 
5. 7 Trade-ins are sometimes used to force the sales/service link 
Exhibit  5.7.1  shows  the  percentage  of  sales  of  new  vehicles  to  private 
customers that involve trade-ins.  Trading-in is a well-established practice and 
a major part of the full-service expectation on the part of consumers. 
Exhibit 5. 7.1 
Transactions involvin% trade-in vehicles 
Proportion of sales to private customers 
which involve 'trade-ins' 
Country  Average %* 
UK  75 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
*1997-1999 
75 
61 
58 
54 
Source: UK Competition Commission 
It is generally recognised that vehicles with fully documented service records 
are more saleable to second or third buyers.  Franchise dealers sometimes 
imply that a  non-franchise service record is of less value than service from 
dealer of the marque, even though a reputable independent garage may have 
serviced  the  vehicle  professionally  and  to  the  manufacturer's  service 
specification.  This is another means of coercing the customer back into the 
franchise network. 
Independent used  vehicle  traders  also  value  a  full  service  record  from  a 
qualified  reputable  garage,  implicitly  using  original  or  equivalent  quality 
parts.  Whether the servicing garage is  franchised or non-franchised is less 
important.  Most  independent  used  vehicle  traders  do  not  have  service 
facilities.  There is therefore no correlation between the trade in of cars and the 
sales/  service link in the independent used car business. 
41 5. 8 Pre-Delivery Inspection (PDf) is not  a iusti/ication [or the sales/service link 
Currently the large majority (90%)  of PDis take place at the franchise dealer, 
although for high volume fleet sales, PDI is increasingly conducted by third 
parties, such as logistics companies. 32  There are also variations in this process 
between  manufacturers,  depending  on  the  source  and  destination  of  the 
vehicles.  Some manufacturers operate import centres, which have facilities for 
rectification and the majority of the elements of PDI, leaving the dealer with a 
final vehicle preparation prior to hand-over, which includes cleaning, visual 
inspection and activation of codes.  The growth of vehicle manufacturers' use 
of PDI centres allows them to control costs more effectively through economies 
of scale, and can be expected to increase in the drive for increased profitability. 
This weakens the notion of an absolute, safety-related link between PDI and 
the franchise dealer outlet. 
•  "PDI is carried out by the dealer or logistics company for each category of customer (retml 
or fleet).  Dealers carry out PDI  for  the vast majority  of retail customers, and logistics 
companies for the majority if large fleet customers.  They have the advantage of economies 
of scale but the dealer has the ultimate responsibly for the condition of the vehicle at hand-
over to their customers. Dealers do however use logistics companies for PDI  when their 
service workshops are full and may continue using them due to economics.  RMIF (GB) 
(12) 
//Bifore a new vehicle is delivered to the  .final consume~; the undertaking within the 
distribution  system  must  give  if  a  technical  inspection/  according  to  the 
manufocturers spec(jication /~  33  This statement appears to imply a process of a 
highly technical nature, very specific to the product and brand.  In fact, PDI is 
not usually a lengthy process (normally 2 to 3 hours).  Nor, historically, has it 
been a very technical one.  The elements normally included are: 
•  Deprotection/  cleaning 
•  Visual inspection for body  I paintwork damage 
•  Mechanical checking/  test drive 
•  Function checking (lights, etc) 
•  Code enabling 
•  Accessory fitment 
•  Final cleaning and valeting 
As such, many non-franchise operators could conduct the PDI process.  One 
aspect is changing, however.  This is  the appearance of instructions to clear 
error codes, conduct a  test drive and clear error codes again.  This requires 
access to specialised diagnostic equipment, which is generally brand-specific. 
The process is evidently becoming more exclusive to the brand, insofar as the 
brand is putting up more proprietary barriers to entry in diagnostics.  This 
forces PDI closer to the franchised workshop (wherever and whatever it is) but 
32 See, for example, "Logistics boss says dealer system may go", Automotive News Europe, 
November 6, 2000, p. 16. 
33 Regulation 1475.95, Recital4. 
42 actually says nothing about the sales/  service link itself.  Therefore, apart from 
the use of specialised diagnostic equipment, there is nothing inherent to the 
PDI process that underpins the sales/  service link. 
5.9  Delivery/collection & hand-over are not  directlv related to the sales/service link 
This aspect is an important second opportunity, after the actual sale, for the 
dealer to establish a relationship with the private buyer.  It should also be the 
time for introducing the customer to the service facility of the dealership, to 
reinforce  the  tie  between  sales  and  service  in  the  customer's  mind,  and 
generally to strengthen their loyalty to the brand.  Where the dealer service 
agent arranges the purchase of the new vehicle from the main dealer (common 
in southern European countries, especially in rural areas), the link between 
sales and service takes a different form, centred around the service end of the 
business.  In fleet sales the whole linkage is much less strong, because of the 
disconnection between purchasers and users of vehicles.  Many used vehicle 
dealers do not have service facilities, although they may recommend a service 
outlet. 
In the context of this  process,  the sales/  service link is  therefore a  relative 
concept,  whose form  and strength depends on the  particular vehicle  sales 
sector. 
Some vehicle manufacturers in Europe seem to be moving towards integrated 
regional networks on a  hub-and-spoke model, with service points clustered 
around a  salespoint.  The initial sale and subsequent trade-in could happen 
either at the centre or by delegation to a service point.  The service relationship 
in the period between will be led from  the service  satellite.  With proper 
handover procedures in both directions, there is no reason for this change to 
harm relationships with customers.  It might in fact  reinforce them, as the 
workshop is the closer and more "solid" entity.  Again, we have here the 
beginnings of a separation of sales from service. 
5.10 The effects o(fying warrantv to the franchise network 
Warranty work is almost wholly conducted by franchised dealers or their sub-
dealers/  agents. The only exceptions to this appear to be where fleet owners 
have their own workshops, which some suppliers have authorised to conduct 
simpler warranty repairs, under close supervision, in a very limited number of 
instances.  Increasingly,  vehicle  manufacturers  are  using  some  form  of 
'intranet' system to process warranty claims from their dealer networks.  It 
would indeed be highly costly to widen this facility to the general aftermarket. 
Dealers are generally authorised to carry out repairs, without referral, up to a 
certain value.  Thereafter they have to seek the supplier's approval.  All repairs 
have to use original equipment parts. 
43 •  It is a common view held by the majority of motorists that the main dealer must complete 
warranty  work.  We  have  experienced  a  number  of  cases  where  dealers  consider 
aftermarket components, despite being manufactured by the same supplier, to be sub-
standard  and,  when  asked,  comment that the  part fitted  was not a  'pattern part'  as 
supplied by the vehicle manufacturer (sic).  Kwilc Fit (GB) (12) 
For the franchise dealer warranty work is often not attractive in comparison to 
private retail work.  Many vehicle manufacturers reimburse labour at a lower 
rate than charges to retail customers.  Hourly charge-out rates are typically 85-
100%  of  those  for  retail  work.  Some  dealers  complain  that  there  is  no 
compensation for additional fault-finding or administrative time.  Margins on 
parts used in warranty are often considerably curtailed, sometimes down to 
dealer's net purchase cost plus a handling fee.  In addition, these margins vary 
considerably between brands and within them between European Member 
States, for reasons which are unclear. 
•  "Quality has improved but complexity has gone up (electronics, airbags, ABS,  etc)  and 
product ranges have been extended (although common platforms compensate for that to 
some extent).  The number of warranty claims has trended  upwards. 10-30%  of dealer 
workshop turnover is for warranty work, depending on make, with some special cases of 
much  higher  incidences,  especially  for  heavy  trucks.  Labour  hours  are  normally 
reimbursed to the dealer at the retail tariff, parts at prices varying between recommended 
retail price and purchase price + handling charge.  But the standard hours prescribed do 
not adequately compensate for  the extra diagnostic and administrative work involved, 
while parts rates are below normal. In practice, warranty work is exclusively conducted in 
franchised  workshops,  on  legal  and  contractual  grounds.  Fundamentally,  franchised 
dealers are free in their parts sourcing.  However, the use of OE  parts is  prescribed for 
warranty work" ZDK  (D) (12) 
•  "Warranty work does not seem to have diminished in volume.  For one brand, it went up 
from 10% of dealer workshop activity in 1999 to 12% in the first half of 2000.  Most makes 
now reimburse dealer warranty hours at the full tariff but parts are generally reimbursed 
at cost, plus an extra percentage for some makes - which is  not always satisfactory for 
dealers" FED  ERA UTO (B) (12) 
•  20-25%  of activity in dealer workshops is  warranty work.  Volumes vary considerably 
between brands and dealers.  Parts are reimbursed at cost for warranty work, there is no 
margin on them  -FA  CONA UTO (E) (12) 
A  workshop full  of warranty work may  therefore  be uneconomic  for  the 
dealer, in comparison to one filled with paid retail customer work. Yet the 
protection of the warranty is a key element in the service decision choices of a 
consumer, while good execution of warranty work can do wonders to restore 
damaged relationships with consumers. 
Warranty is a  natural extension of the  supplier's new product obligations. 
Free rectification of problems helps create a genuine bond of the customer to 
the brand.  As manufacturers pay for the parts and labour, they are entitled to 
insist on them coming from  their own sources.  But there is  an element of 
forcing. Evidence exists 34 that consumers are sometimes not informed of their 
right to have non-warranty servicing and repair work undertaken outside the 
franchise  network during the warranty period.  Fleet companies are more 
34 UK OFT Report Car Service and Repair, August 2000 
44 aware of this dynamic - and some have the added advantage of an approval 
system for garages, whether franchised or independent.  They are more able 
than the general public to assess the general competence of repairers.  It is also 
very noticeable how service retention by dealer workshops falls off, once the 
warranty expires. 
•  The manufacturer refuses to independent garages their legitimate right to carry out service 
and repair during the warranty period Consumers are led to believe that they are obliged 
to go to the franchised dealer workshop during the warranty period.  OBD systems drive 
motorists to the dealer workshop- EASRA (12) 
•  Independent garages  cannot perform  warranty  work,  as  the  manufacturers  refuse  to 
reimburse the labour hours.  Warranties should be supplied by independent insurance 
providers, so that the customer has freedom of choice- VKYV (D) (12) 
Warranty is  not only a  means of keeping customers satisfied.  Conducted 
within a selective and exclusive network, it is also a way of catching remaining 
quality  problems  after  the  factory  gate  and  keeping  the  incidence  of  the 
problems quiet.  This is one reason for which warranty statistics are treated as 
highly confidential. 
Most used vehicle warranty providers allow the consumer to take the vehicle 
to a VAT registered independent garage of their choice for servicing, although 
some will stipulate that the first service after acquisition should be conducted 
at the franchise dealer.  These providers need access to information on failure 
incidence rates, in order to set their premiums. 
In conclusion, warranty covers product obligations on the part of the vehicle 
manufacturers.  They are entitled to prescribe where and how warranty work 
is conducted.  However, implying that normal servicing and repair carried out 
outside  the  franchise  network  will  invalidate  warranties  is  an  unnatural 
forcing of the sales/  service link. 
5.11 Apart from safety related issues, recalls can relate to simple qua!t fy problems 
Recalls  are initiated when there is  an identified problem with a  model of 
vehicle - it is  another form of post-factory rectification.  All manufacturers 
have  similar  procedures,  although  they  may  execute  them  somewhat 
differently. 
The  identification  of  problems  is  mainly  made  through  the  vehicle 
manufacturers'  service,  manufacturing  and  engineering  functions,  and 
through the dealer workshop network.  In a few instances the problems are 
notified by outside bodies, such as safety inspectorates. 
The affected vehicles are identified by their chassis numbers. If  the vehicle is in 
the early stages of its life,  then dealers' customer files  may be sufficient to 
ensure that most customers are contacted.  Manufacturers may, however, also 
have to  involve state vehicle  licensing authorities  to  obtain the name and 
45 address of the current owner, particularly for older vehicles and/  or used cars, 
which no longer return to the selling dealer for service.  Manufacturers will 
also in certain cases use national media advertising for a recall when there is 
need to inform the public quickly.  In this sense this is no different from food 
safety related recalls. 
It is understandable that for safety, speed and cost effectiveness, repairs are 
conducted by supplier-approved agents, in order that they can easily monitor 
the number of affected  vehicles  which have been repaired.  Many national 
licensing  authorities  also  require  confirmation  that  vehicles  have  been 
rectified.  Vehicle manufacturers organise the mass provision of replacement 
parts into the dealer network through their sophisticated distribution systems. 
Safety-related recalls are always notified to the relevant public authority and 
vehicles are repaired as soon as possible.  However, licensing authorities in 
some European countries will not make such information available to  third 
parties, which seems an obstruction of actions for public safety. 
•  "For  legally  prescribed  (i.e.  safety  related)  recalls,  owners  are  contacted  by  the 
manufacturer  or  importer.  There  are  also  "silent  recalls",  which  affect  comfort  and 
convenience, and which are exclusively handled through the dealer network. Dealers are 
able to contact owners through their IT systems" ZDK  (D) (12) 
•  "There are two kinds of recall.  Safety related recalls are widely publicised, through the 
media and organisations such as ANWB.  Other recalls are handled when the vehicle is 
next in the workshop.  There is no public information" AM11B (NL) (12) 
Non-safety-related  recalls  are  not  so  advertised  ('silent  recalls')  and 
rectification is usually conducted in the franchise network when the vehicle is 
next presented for  service.  Indeed vehicle  manufacturers usually identify 
them  differently,  using  titles  such  as  'Product  Update'  and  'Customer 
Satisfaction' campaigns.  Having selective and exclusive dealer partners makes 
it easier to prevent information about non-safety recalls leaking out.  While a 
well-organised recall can have a  beneficial influence on brand image,  it is 
nevertheless also an admission of a quality problem. 
•  "A manufacturer's willingness to recall a product is also influenced by the fact that recalls 
have lately often generated a rather negative reaction in the media and the product quality 
was  doubted.  Especially  if  recalls  accumulate,  the  manufacturer  will  tend  to  have 
additional  defects  rectified  in  the  framework  of  maintenance  services,  or at least not 
communicate the recall through the media."  ADA  C (D) (12) 
•  "The number of cases  where manufacturers  delay  recall  actions  even if safety-related 
defects are involved has not decreased.  While the manufacturers' fear of damage to their 
image  and  pressure  by  the  public  or  the  automobile  clubs  plays  an  important role, 
experience shows that they delay a recall action in at least 1/3 of the cases, rather showing 
an upward trend.  We  understand that the general increase in recall actions is  to  some 
extent due to deterioration in quality.  Even family cars and small cars are fitted with even 
more technical extras. To reduce the costs, low-quality products are used."  ADAC  (D) (12) 
•  "Recalls  in  Germany  are  virtually  all  conducted  under  the  responsibility  of  the 
manufacturers.  There are therefore no official statistics on them, only what can be gleaned 
from the press.  A tightening up would be desirable in this area" TiiV  (D) (12) 
46 The issue with recalls is not whether the franchise dealer network should be 
responsible for carrying out the recall and rectification- this is a normal part 
of  the  manufacturer  accepting  responsibility  for  rectifying  defects,  free  of 
charge.  Where the rectification is carried out - by the dealer, sub dealer or 
factory  - is  up  to  the  manufacturer.  The  use  of  certified  independent 
workshops may sometimes be  appropriate.  The  problem is  more lack  of 
transparency about quality problems, in cases where no public notification is 
made.  A cynic might take the view that the sales/  service link is used to keep 
the bad news within the family.  Although the right to return defective goods 
exists in some countries, Europe has no direct equivalent of the US  Lemon 
Laws, applied in many States. 
512  Maintenance and  repair and  the sales/semice link 
512.1  Consumers  in d(fferent  sectors  o.f the  market make  d(fferent  trade-offs  in 
selecting providers o.fsemice 
Exhibit 512.1 
Distance to semice provision 
Maximum distance prepared 
to go to service car 
Maximum travel 
distance (miles)  % Drivers 
up to 3  30% 
3 to 6  31% 
6 to 9  14% 
9 to 12  8% 
12 to 15  5% 
-15to18  3% 
Over 18  9% 
Source /COP I Lex 1998 
Proximity to the consumer is one of the key decision points for  choosing a 
service provider.  Over 60%35 of motorists do not wish to travel more than 10 
kms to  have their vehicle  serviced,  as  Exhibit 5.12.1  shows.  Service is  an 
integral  part  of  the  product ownership  experience  for  vehicles  and  does 
therefore directly affect the image of the product brand, insofar as sales and 
service are strongly linked in the SED system.  Serviceability is linked to the 
reputation for  reliability and durability, as well as cost of ownership.  An 
ICDP36 study of German motorists found that the principal components of the 
serviceability part of the brand image included: 
•  Technical complexity 
35 ICDP:Future Directions for European Car Distribution Evolution or Revolution? 9/98 
36 Aftersales in Europe, Research Paper 2/97 
47 •  Availability and cost of parts 
•  Amount of servicing (intervals, length, cost) 
•  Convenience of servicing (location) 
•  Quality of service 
Satisfaction with service is a function of multiple factors, led by quick service, 
friendliness and price/  quality, as Exhibit 5.12.2 shows. 
Exhibd 512.2 
Service satis/ilction German consumers 
Reasons for Service Satisfaction, Germany '95 
Extra Service 
Flexible 
On time 
Trustworthy ·-B!!I 
Safe/Orderly 
Distance 
Competent 
Thorough 
Price/quality 
Friendly 
Quick Service ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
0  5  10  15  20 
jm%  Stating j 
Source: /CD~  Aflersa/es in Europe 
Users  of  dealer  and independent workshops select  their  service  providers 
based on significantly different criteria.  The sales/  service link matters to the 
former but not much to the latter, for whom the relationship with the service 
outlet itself is most important.  Professional (fleet and other) buyers of new 
cars are also likely to break the sales/  service link. 
•  "Finance and  leasing  companies  have now  developed  into  major  distribution  players 
across  Europe.  They  conduct  a  significant  proportion  of  business  sales  - they  have 
developed  preferred  networks of suppliers,  working to  their own quality  standards. '' 
/CD~  Future directions  for European Car Dl~'>fribution, 1998. 
When a  new car buyer switches brands, their service loyalty will typically 
switch to the service outlet of the new brand.  Not so for used cars, where the 
primary relationship stays with the known independent service garage.  A 
British survey of car owners, performed as part of the Office of Fair Trading 
inquiry into vehicle servicing and repair, illustrates this point (Exhibit 5.12.3) 
Exhibit 512.3 
48 Reasons (or choosing service outlet 
Reason for choosing outlet for this service- main dealers v. independents 
Used in  past 1EEEE~E:::::,42%  Quality service  39% 
Most convenient  34% 
Was recommended -'========~3~1  'X ~o --
Local dealer for make of car l  45% 
They can always fit you in  -~~~~!lrrzz!EEllllmEElJ 
Work done speedily  J!B~ITl:mill:l:lEill!EI 
Cheaper than local competitors  ~===~~---
Bought the car there l  32% 
Warranty conditions -----· 
Long opening hours 
Had shopped around 
Member of AA/RAC approval scheme 
Other 
Source TNS  Harris (op.  cit.) 
•  Main dealers 
Base: 321  -All using 
main dealer for service 
in  last 6 months 
IE] Independent garages 
Base: 414- All using 
independent garage 
for service 
in  last 6 months 
Main dealers lead on only three criteria: 'local dealer for make of car'; 'bought 
the  car  there';  and  'warranty  conditions'.  Independent  garages  lead  on 
everything else, notably: 'used in past'; 'quality of service'; 'most convenient'; 
and 'was recommended'.  Franchise dealerships emphasise the sales/  service 
link,  presenting their workshops as an integral part of the product brand 
image (for better or for worse, depending on the quality of the workshop's 
performance).  Independent garages have only the quality of their service to 
offer.  The good ones focus on their relationships with their customer base. 
•  "The equipment in independent workshops is more costly, because of having to handle all 
makes.  The reason:  there is  no device on the market which will communicate with all 
models.  Manufacturers only release the technical data for vehicles over 3 years old.  This 
puts independent repairers and  the consumer at huge disadvantage.  Consumers are 
forced into the dealership.  Manufacturers refuse to supply error codes for vehicles less 
than 3  years  old.  Key  functions,  such as  airbags,  immobilisers,  error files  cannot be 
accessed, as communication with the processors is impossible.  This is  demonstrable for 
Opel,  VW,  Daimler-Benz,  Ford,  BMW,  etc.  However,  OBD  emissions  data  is  made 
available, because this is legally required."  VKJ11 (Moster Garage Federation- D) (12) 
•  "The principal difference in the range and nature of service/repair activities undertaken 
by franchised and independent repair garages is the fact that franchised garages generally 
do repair and servicing work as part of the manufacturer's warranty."  AA (UK) (12) 
Franchise  dealers  do  appear  to  have  an  initial  competitive  advantage  in 
consumers' minds in the first ownership cycle.  The natural tendency of a large 
proportion of consumers is to use the service provider of the make.  In the first 
cycle there is an  implicit lock in; the second cycle is still a large opportunity for 
the franchise dealer; but beyond this dealers are often uncompetitive- not just 
on price but also on flexibility and responsiveness to customers' needs. 
In effect, consumers like to have access to a  local, 'official' service outlet or 
network, particularly during the warranty period.  Reality shows that outside 
the  warranty  period,  consumers  go  to  both  the  franchised  dealers  and 
49 independents to  service  their vehicles.  Therefore  they do not require  the 
network  to  be  solely  in  the  franchise  sector,  rather  it  could  be  another 
authorised or accredited service point in the independent sector. 
5.12.2 Routine maintenance and  repair is a shrinking  secto~; open to competition 
First services, at around 1,500 km, are now virtually a thing of the past. Longer 
service intervals and increasingly component life have pushed more and more 
routine service and repair activities into the independent sector, as discussed 
earlier.  The consumer has the right to have service performed in a workshop 
of his or her choice, whether franchise or independent.  In the mind of many 
consumers there is no sales/  service link.  However, as mentioned above, the 
franchise sector appears to play on consumers' fears of warranty invalidation 
and reduced resale value to keep them in its workshops. 
It is  extremely  difficult  to  find  any  reliable  evidence  about  whether  the 
franchise or independent workshops provide better or worse service.  It is 
important to distinguish between 
11 equipped to do" and 
11 does well".  There is 
a growing perception that independent garages are shut out of certain areas by 
lack of proprietary equipment available only to their franchise counterparts. 
For jobs that both can perform the differences are less evident.  In Germany, it 
is a legal requirement that any garage be run by a qualified Meister.  There are 
some formal requirements in France but much less in southern Europe and the 
UK. 
•  Quality assurance can be found only where a competent and well trained person does 
perform the job.  This is  more often the case in independent garages, the more so if  the 
owner is a very good specialist.  In most EU member countries quality certification systems 
have been set up (ISO 9000 in Germany, certification in France, BOVAG standard in the 
Netherlands, etc) tailored to the specific needs of the automotive business. CECRA (B) (12) 
Complaints about workshops generally seem to be about evenly split between 
the franchise and independent sectors.  Both miss deliberately planted defects 
in  mystery  shopping  tests  in  about  the  same  proportions.  There  is  no 
statistical evidence available about whether one sector or the other causes 
more accidents through defective work. 
There is  no obvious technical link of service to  the selling outlet.  Special 
tooling (tools,  jigs and fixtures  specific  to one or more models of a  given 
brand) typically only forms 5-10%  of the fixed investment in a garage.  This 
does  not  constitute  an  insuperable  investment  obstacle  to  independent 
repairers.  Vehicle manufacturers concede that they do not ask their dealers to 
invest in tooling and equipment for  a number of low-volume operations in 
which  they  are  not  competent.  Thus  diesel  injection  work,  engine 
reconditioning  and  major  crash  repair  are  widely  subcontracted  to 
independent,  all-makes  specialists.  On-board  electronic  and  diagnostic 
systems, however, present a  far  more serious problem for  the independent 
trade (see below). 
50 Vehicle manufacturers invest huge amounts of time and money in defining 
and  implementing  service  and  repair  procedures  and  standards  in  their 
franchise networks.  The pity is that this investment is then over-milked within 
the dealership to support the internal cross-subsidy of vehicle sales. Service 
department managers are pressured to maximise utilisation of assets, which 
can endanger the carefully built-up quality approach.  Dealers are encouraged 
to invest in training of service personnel, which is claimed to be highly brand-
specific.  At the same time, pride is taken in the fact that defecting service 
personnel form a main source of qualified staff for the all-makes independent 
sector.  This suggests that the real training investment is in basic mechanical 
and electrical capabilities, which can be applied to servicing and repairing all 
products of all makes, with only an overlay of brand-specific elements. 
All  these considerations indicate that there is no fundamental link between 
current service and repair and the sales of a specific brand. 
5.12.3 Electronic and  diagnostic systems have the potenticll to be used as a mqjor new 
means of  shutting out independent all-makes repairers 
The ability to interface with, interrogate and act upon the increasing number of 
on-board electronic systems requires franchise dealer workshops to invest in 
diagnostic and interface equipment that can cost up to Euro 100,00()37.  As the 
hardware and software are almost always specific to a brand, this creates an 
absolutely  prohibitive  investment  barrier  against  independent  all-makes 
workshops.  In  effect,  they  are  rapidly  being  shut  out  of  this  sector  of 
maintenance and repair. 
•  "A problem for independent garages is  the increasing number of electronic transmission 
and braking-related equipment, e.g.  ABS,  ASR,  ESP,  etc,  leading to  higher qualification 
requirements for  the garage in terms  of fault diagnosis and repair.  In  many cases,  an 
independent  garage  is  unable  to  provide  such  service,  in  view  of  the  considerable 
investments required for the necessary equipment to cover all vehicle makes." ADAC (D) 
(12) 
•  "With the advance of technology  in component systems  and coded electronic systems 
being fitted to new vehicles, the independent sector is potentially disadvantaged in being 
able to  diagnose faults  on a  vehicle  and consequently effect repair by  replacing parts" 
Major Systems Supplier. (12) 
Component manufacturers who design the diagnostic equipment on behalf of 
the vehicle manufacturer are not always free then to distribute the equipment 
into the independent aftermarket.  There are some systems available which 
carry out the diagnostics on the majority of vehicles but they do not cover all 
functions.  The only major exception is on emissions controls, where there are 
legal requirements that the systems be made openly accessible. 
•  "The supply of the necessary technical information to independent repairers is still 
dragging on in some vehicle makes.  This is the reason why Block Exemption Regulation 
37 Vehicle manufacturers' responses to Commission questionnaire (12) 
51 should adopt the 3-monthly period for the transmission of technical data to all repair 
market operators as already provided by the On-Board-Diagnostics (OBD) directive." 
CECRA (B)(12) 
•  "Often vehicle manufacturers try to compel equipment suppliers to grant them exclusivity 
rights on equipment for new models.  In general equipment manufacturers do not grant 
such exclusivity rights.  If they do so these rights cover a maximum period of one year". 
EGEA (8)(12) 
The number of suppliers of processors and of on-board systems is limited. 
While standardisation of componentry by function and of communications 
protocols is currently done across vehicle brands belonging to a  group, it is 
supposedly impossible across different groups.  The effect  of all  this  is  to 
recreate  exclusivity  in  servicing  capability.  Whether  this  is  technically 
necessary  or  economically  justified  is  unclear.  There  are  suspicions  that 
vehicle  manufacturers  are  deliberately  promoting  technical  differences  to 
support exclusivity in service, exclude independent garage competitors and 
restore lost parts and service profits to their dealerships.  There have been loud 
calls  for  standardisation  of  devices  and  procedures  from  independent 
repairers  and  much  more  discreet  ones  from  systems  and  component 
suppliers. 
We  can  conclude  therefore  that  both  lack  of  standardisation  and  new 
technologies are being used to force the sales/  service link 
513 Safety/emissions inspections are a/readv /argelv disconnected /tom the franchise 
sector 
Every European country has a vehicle testing programme, although these are 
not fully harmonised across Europe.  In Germany and the UK the date of the 
first test is when the vehicle has been licensed for 3 years, in France testing 
starts at 4  years, and it has come down from 10 years to 4  years in Italy. 
Increasingly, many vehicles are only repaired or serviced at the time of the 
annual test in order to ensure that they pass.  Testing is obviously important 
contributor to safety- and also to the size of the aftermarket in Europe. 
Testing is not confined to the franchise sector.  Accreditation to conduct annual 
tests is given by a  central government authority based on the suitability of 
premises, equipment and trained personnel, irrespective of whether the outlet 
is  franchised  or  non-franchised,  or  whether  it  has  a  sales  showroom  or 
otherwise.  This is an example of an independent, recognised arbiter judging 
the  suitability  of the outlet on given  criteria,  predominantly facilities  and 
training. 
514 Vehicle recvcling is not connected to the sa/es/semice link 
52 Vehicles are usually scrapped when the cost of repair exceeds the value of the 
vehicle,  whatever the age  of the vehicle.  European legislation38  presently 
requires that 75%  of the vehicle weight must be recycled, this will increase to 
85% in 2005 and 95%  in 2015.  This will become a heavy burden on the vehicle 
suppliers, on whom the responsibility for  recycling rests.  By  the time most 
vehicles are scrapped they have long left the franchise network for repair and 
maintenance.  This  process  is  therefore  disconnected  from  either  sales  or 
service. 
Because  of  the  vast  improvements  in  component  quality,  some  vehicle 
manufacturers have already started to recycle  and resell  refurbished parts 
through their networks, at prices designed to attract users of older vehicles 
back into their franchise service outlets.  As the manufacturers' liability for 
recycling increases, this market can be expected to increase dramatically. 
At  present,  most  stages  of  this  process  take  place  outside  the  franchise 
sales/  service channels- though waste collection companies, scrap yards, third 
party re-manufacturers, and parts reconditioners.  All aftersales distributors, 
franchised and independent, will become involved in this market, on account 
of the volume of recycled parts that will be generated and in order to serve all 
possible customer segments.  This is independent of any sales  I service link in 
the early stages of a vehicle's life. 
5.15 Vehicle manutizcturers have a major financial interest in the sales-service link 
Original equipment replacement parts under the vehicle manufacturer's brand 
are only available through the franchise network.  Equivalent quality parts 
under the brand of the component supplier are available though independent 
distributors.  Under the provisions of regulation 1475/95, franchise  dealer 
workshops are entitled to use equivalent quality parts, provided they inform 
the consumer, and distributors are entitled to supply them under their own 
brand or the component manufacturers brand. 
However, it is often implied that equivalent quality parts (even when made by 
the same component manufacturer as the OE parts) are not original and are 
therefore inferior, which can be used to influence consumers.  Although the 
consumer in theory has a free choice of sources for equivalent quality parts, in 
practise there is significant pressure to employ OES  parts.  Pressure to use 
parts from OES  sources is  exercised on dealers though parts consumption 
objectives  and  retrospective  bonuses,  which  are  also  sometimes  linked  to 
vehicle sales objectives and bonuses. 
•  "Many spare parts can only be sourced from franchised dealers. Even current parts, such 
as disc brake rotors and friction are not released to the independent aftermarket by VW. 
Up to 60%  of parts for vehicles under 3 years old come under such restrictions"  VKW  (D) 
(12) 
38 75/442/EC End of Vehicle Life Directive, as amended by 2000/53/EC 
53 •  "We  have  no  evidence  but  we  received  signals  that  many  manufacturers  use  their 
intellectual  property  rights  to  prevent original equipment parts suppliers from  selling 
body parts to  the independent aftermarket sector.  These questions have to be asked of 
parts manufacturers." CECRA (B) (12) 
•  "In the  recent  past,  the  terms  of  the  current regulation  1475/95  under  which  Block 
Exemption was granted to the European vehicle manufacturers, has not been respected in 
many cases by some of those manufacturers.  In particular I refer to the open and free right 
to provide products and service into the Independent Aftermarket." CLEPA (B) (12) 
•  "We do not think that 1475.95  adequately protects the dealer's right to  use equivalent-
quality parts.  One can observe a  tendency to  locking up the parts market. The classic 
example  is  design  rights.  This  has  a  negative  impact on  independent  garages  and 
distributors but, above all, on consumers" AK  (A) (12) 
Independent  systems  and  component  suppliers,  who  are  increasingly 
responsible for the technology and design of their products, produce 70- 80% 
of all parts.  OES parts supply is  a major source of profitability for vehicle 
manufacturers, who typically take a 60-65%  gross margin on them, limiting 
their franchise dealers to much lower gross margins.  The main dealer acting 
as  both  wholesaler  and  workshop  has  a  40-45%  gross  margin.  A  range 
assembler supplying the independent aftermarket will typically operate on a 
20%  gross margin on its sales into the independent distribution trade, while 
the combination of independent distributor and workshop lives on a 55-60% 
gross margin.  This means that there is much tighter control of the value chain 
in the OES sector. 
•  "Franchised dealers have the infrastructure and expertise to remain as major competitors 
in the aftermarket - it is the economic factors that are the barrier to their regaining market 
share.  However there are unlikely to be radical moves in this direction as long as parts 
profits remain 'ring fenced' within car manufacturers." /CD~  Future directions for European 
Cur Distnbution, 1998 
•  "The dealer may be reluctant to purchase parts from sources other than their respective 
vehicle  manufacturers  by  virtue  of  their  economic  dependency  on  the  vehicle 
manufacturer. Dealers are commonly rewarded by rebates or bonus schemes contingent on 
achievement of sales targets of the vehicle manufacturers products". Major Systems Supplier 
(12) 
In the independent sector, the distributor has to respond to market conditions. 
In the franchise sector, the distributor is constrained from responding to them 
- unless the vehicle manufacturer facilitates it.  This parallels the margin and 
price  controls  that  vehicle  manufacturers  exercise  over  their  distribution 
channels for vehicles. 
•  "In our sector, various cases have been reported confidentially to CLEDIPA's distributor 
members that car manufacturers exert an informal pressure on their franchised  dealers 
and workshops in order to prevent the supply of replacement parts of equivalent (or even 
superior) quality from entering the independent aftermarket.  However no evidence can be 
provided on our side. Car manufacturers avoid written instruction because this  would 
contravene  regulation  1475/95  and  endanger  their  exemption.  Pressure  is  exerted 
indirectly and subliminally.  E.g.  on the occasion of contract negotiations (threat not to 
renew /  to cancel the dealers contract) or when representatives of the car manufacturers 
"visit" the dealers stock."  CLEDIPA (B) (12) 
•  "Supply of equivalent quality parts to dealership workshops is inhibited in two principal 
ways.  First, through design rights.  Second by manufacturers exercising informal pressure 
54 on  dealers,  implicitly  during  contract  negotiations  and  when  manufacturers' 
representatives  inspect  dealers'  parts  stores.  This  cannot  be  documented  but  we 
constantly hear about it informally.  There are obviously no written records, as they would 
contradict 1475.95  and endanger a  manufacturer's right to  it.  Manufacturers exercise 
similar  implicit  and  informal  pressure  on  component  suppliers  not  to  sell  into  the 
independent aftermarket.  Nobody simply refuses to supply - they invoke manufacturers' 
patent protection  or  their  ownership  of  tools  and  dies.  Manufacturers  also  conduct 
publicity campaigns to induce consumers only to buy OE parts.  Those who believe in this 
publicity are thereby discouraged from buying equivalent quality parts from OE suppliers 
in the independent aftermarket.  This is not a potential infringement of cartel laws but of 
those on misleading publicity" GVA (D) (12) 
•  "We have no specific evidence of this,  but the vehicle manufacturers will frequently in 
their standard terms of purchasing or development agreements seek a transfer to them of 
supplier intellectual property rights created during product development.  They may also 
seek to impose exclusivity of supply contractually or through tooling ownership which, if 
acceded  to,  would also  effectively  restrict or prevent sales  of products to  third parties 
(dealers or the independent sector)." Major Systems Supplier (12) 
Competition in the parts market is  effectively constrained.  Recommended 
retail prices for spare parts in both the OES and lAM-T sectors are commonly 
set by comparison with each other.  Liberating this market is a major concern 
for suppliers operating in both the OES and lAM channels. 
"We are concerned that the removal of Regulation 1475195 would create a less competitive 
marketplace in which the vehicle manufacturers may be able to impose restrictions on 
component manufacturers that would then be legitimate under general law (even as recently 
amended by the Vertical Restraints Legislation). The key principles that we believe must be 
preserved in any scenario to ensure that the highly competitive marketplace that exists today is 
maintained are as follows: 
1.  The vehicle manufacturers must not be able to restrict the component manufacturer from 
selling to the Independent Aftermarket. 
2.  There must be no restriction on the component manufacturer selling matching quality 
parts to dealers or other vehicle manufacturer outlets. 
3.  There must be no restriction on VM dealers buying parts of matching quality from third 
parties. 
4.  There should be no use by the vehicle manufacturers of tooling ownerships I intellectual 
property rights I branding rights to restrict the component manufacturers or dealers rights 
listed in points 1 to 3 above. 
5.  There must be continued rights for the component manufacturer to brand products with 
its own brand. 
6.  There must be clarity of use of parts and service descriptions to avoid inconsistent and 
misleading use of commonly used terms (e.g. 'genuine', 'original'). 
There must be freedom of access for repairers or associations that collate information on their 
behalf to technical information required to allow vehicle diagnostic and repairs to take place 
and competitive prices in the Independent Aftermarket.  This issue is of increasing importance 
and must be addressed to ensure that the consumer has real freedom of choice in preparing 
and diagnosing increasingly sophisticated inter-dependent and integrated vehicle systems". 
Major Systems Supplier (12) 
The vehicle manufacturers have a major financial interest in the continuation 
of sales/  service link.  This not only enables the cross subsidy from aftermarket 
to sales within the dealership.  Tied sales of OE parts through dealers also 
cross subsidise manufacturers' sales of vehicles. 
55 5.16 In summary,  the sales/seroice link is much less natural and much more forced 
than often appears 
The nature and strength of the sales/  service link is very much dependent on 
the context within which it operates, i.e.  the type of distribution regime in 
place: 
•  Search  and  selection  for  new  vehicles  is  primarily  based  on  product 
characteristics, not on the service experience, which is a post sales activity. 
The bundling of 'additional' benefits, such as free servicing and extended 
warranties, forces a link between sales and service.  Private consumers can 
only source new vehicles directly (or indirectly) through channels heavily 
controlled by the producer.  Test drives are a method of sales promotion 
and are independent of service.  The link between sales and service in this 
context is supplier-forced, not natural 
•  Negotiation between the private customer and the dealer is constrained by 
the  customer's  lack  of  purchasing  power  and  the  dealer's  poor  sales 
margins.  It is focused solely on the sale of the vehicle, not on service.  Fleet 
customers can negotiate both sales  and service  prices but are not then 
constrained to use particular facilities.  There is no natural sales/  service 
link in this process 
•  Many new vehicle finance  packages are an explicit attempt to  enhance 
revenue streams for the franchise system by requiring the owner to use the 
service  facilities  of  the  dealer.  Used  vehicle  finance  schemes  in  the 
independent sector give the consumer freedom of choice of service outlet. 
The link between new vehicle sales and service is therefore being forced 
•  Insurance sales are not linked to service 
•  Extended warranty sales for new vehicles are clearly a means of forcing the 
sales/  service link 
•  Although trade-in values are influenced by the service record of a vehicle, 
there is no natural link between this and servicing in the franchise sector 
•  The link between PDI and franchise  dealers has already been broken in 
many  corporate  sales,  and  is  therefore  no  longer  a  justification  for  a 
sales/  service link 
•  Delivery, collection and handover are part of the sales cycle, but not related 
to aftersales service.  Whilst they can be used to introduce the consumer to 
the service facility, there is no natural link 
•  The conduct of warranty, as part of the manufacturers' obligations for new 
product, has a natural link to the manufacturers' appointed service agents. 
That  these  have  to  be  brand-exclusive  or  franchised  is  not  'proven', 
although it clearly allows a supplier to control information with regard to 
quality problems.  Warranty work carried out on used vehicles frequently 
occurs  in  independent  repair  garages  without  sales  facilities,  and 
demonstrates that the sales/  service link is not driven by the market 
•  Similarly, the tying of recalls to the franchise sector, although probably the 
most cost-effective process for the supplier, constrains consumer choice by 
56 forcing  vehicles  back  into  the  franchise  network.  Suppliers  are  only 
obliged to  notify authorities about safety-related recalls.  Other quality 
problems are only addressed if the vehicle returns to the franchise sector 
for service, and these are not generally publicised.  Certified independent 
workshops  could  carry  out  the  necessary  rectification,  if  they  were 
informed that a  problem existed.  However, the  majority of recalls are 
'silent', so that only vehicles returning to the franchise sector for service 
will be rectified.  This not therefore proof of a natural link 
•  Maintenance and repair is not naturally linked to sales, but is increasingly 
being used to force the sales/  service link, in order to make up for the poor 
profitability  of  the  franchise  sales  channels.  Across  Europe,  50%  of 
maintenance and repair is conducted in the independent sector.  Lack of 
component standardisation and new technologies may be used as a major 
new means of shutting out independent repairers and forcing consumers 
back into  the  suppliers'  exclusive  networks.  Yet  safety  and emissions 
inspections  are  already  mainly  disconnected  from  the  franchise  sector. 
Consumers in different sectors of the market make different trade-offs in 
selecting providers of service, and given freedom of choice they use service 
providers they find competent - independently of whether they are the 
suppliers' exclusive outlets or not 
•  Recycling  primarily takes  place  after  the  vehicle  has left  the  franchise 
network and is not connected to the sales/  service link 
•  Vehicle manufacturers and their exclusive dealers have a major financial 
interest in implicitly and explicitly forcing  the sales/  service link in the 
minds of the consumer - their aftersales activities subsidise vehicle sales at 
all levels of the channels 
The  sales/  service  link  therefore,  although  a  natural  result  of  market 
requirements in some cases, is in the main often forced by the interests of 
suppliers. 
57 6. Conclusions 
6.1 The sales/service link is more [orced than natural 
The structural analysis of the downstream sectors of the industry in Chapter 3 
suggests that the sales/  service link is far from the only game in town.  This 
link is not a wholly natural one and may be forced under some circumstances. 
At least some alternatives exist. 
The analysis of forces and trends in Chapter 4 indicates that major changes are 
happening in the distribution environment, including the growth of on-board 
electronic  and  diagnostic  systems,  which  operate  as  new  barriers  against 
competition from the independent aftermarket.  This has the potential to make 
the sales/  service link even more forced. 
From the analysis in the previous sections of Chapter 5,  it is clear that the 
nature and strength of the sales/  service link is very much dependent on the 
context within which it operates, i.e. the type of distribution regime in place. 
Under current  distribution  arrangements,  it  is  more  producer-driven than 
market-driven. 
In Exhibit 6.1  we have  therefore  taken each  of the  elements  examined in 
Chapter 5  and consolidated them into a  framework,  against the following 
questions 
•  "Is this process currently exclusive to franchise dealers?" 
•  "Is this a  natural result of market forces,  or is  it in any way forced by 
suppliers?" 
•  "Are there credible alternatives today, within the SED system?" 
•  "Could credible alternatives exist tomorrow, in the absence of SED?" 
The term 'natural' is used to mean that the link arises in response to genuine 
market demand.  By the term 'forced' we mean that the supplier is imposing 
the link implicitly or explicitly on its partners and the market. 
For example: although information on product evaluations is not exclusive to 
the  franchise  sector,  vehicle  manufacturers  clearly  limit  public  access  to 
objective  comparative information about product safety,  quality,  reliability 
and lifecycle costs.  39 
From Column 2 in the table, we see that about half the activities involved in 
the relationship of consumers with dealers are kept exclusive to the franchised 
sector, while the other half are in fact open to some form of competition.  From 
Column 3 we see that most of the exclusive activities are so, not because of 
some law of business or competitive economics, but because manufacturers 
39 Witness, for example, the industry's hostile reaction to independent crash testing, sponsored 
by governments and consumer federations. 
58 operating within the SED  system have made them so,  i.e.  they are forced. 
Column 4 shows that credible alternatives exist today for many of the service 
functions  but not for  those  directly related  to  vehicle  sales,  on which  the 
franchise networks still have an absolute lock- as a direct result of SED and 
Regulation 1475.95.  Column 5 suggests that alternatives could be found for all 
functions. 
Exhibit6.1 
The consolidated picture [or the nezo car sales and  seroice links 
Natural or  Credible  Credible 
Activities  Exclusive to  Forced by  Alternatives- Alternatives-
Franchise Dealers?  Suppliers?  Today?  Tomorrow? 
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Through the disaggregation of the various activities of service and repair, we 
have sought to show the subtle and artificial links which are used to justify the 
link  between  sales  and  service  in  the  automotive  aftermarket.  The 
sales/  service link, although natural in some cases, is very often the result of 
forcing, rather than an independent phenomenon. 
6.2 llzere mav  be viable alternatives 
Forced  links  and  cross-subsidies  are  often  presented  by  the  industry  as 
unquestioned benefits in their own right:  service  subsidising sales,  simple 
service subsidising complex repair tasks, or urban outlets subsidising rural 
ones.  Correspondingly, competitors who exploit the resulting price umbrellas 
to establish focused formats with lower costs and prices (and sometimes better 
service) are derided as "free riders": 
/fllze  independent~ particularly the .fast  fit~ concentrate on the higher-volum~ 
less  complex job~ those  which prov1de  the highest profit and the lowest risk 
leaving the  .franchised network to carry the responsib!lity  .for the lower  proji~ more 
complex and less .frequent work.  The  dealer  network ensures the foil range o.f 
seroice~ independent o.f complexity or  projitab!li!Jt also covering rare models.  !f 
59 independents  had to  cover  everything  their  costs  would  rise  constderab!y. 
Without the dealer network customers would  foce an oversupply in current work 
and a scarcity if  supply in complex work.  For the most esoteric work and  for 
thinly  populated  region~ there might be no cover at all  There would be particular 
problems in stifety- and  environment-related  categorie~ which require particularly 
high quality if  work and if  commercial and  moral  probity  H- Vehicle Manufocturer 
(12) 
In most sectors, businesses linked by cross-subsidy are seen as fair targets for 
unbundling by focused entrepreneurs, especially in the age of the Internet. 40 
Unbundling has  in  fact  begun  to  take  place  within  the  franchise  system, 
loosening the sales/  service link: 
•  In Southern Europe, through the agent/  sub-dealer system 
•  In areas  of low  population  density,  particularly  in Scandinavia, 
where full exclusive facilities would be uneconomic, some vehicle 
manufacturers sub-contract to independent repairers to 'in-fill' gaps 
in service availability41 (12) 
•  There are incipient moves by the vehicle manufacturers to reduce 
the role of franchise dealers in new car sales 
Alternatives to  the franchise  system itself do exist,  although they are still 
imperfectly structured.  The independent aftermarket sector accounts for 50% 
of the European service market.  The historical conflict between the franchise 
and independent sectors is arbitrary and wasteful. 
Each of these systems, franchised and independent, has deficiencies: 
•  Quality resources are stretched and scarce.  They are inefficiently used in 
the two competing systems 
•  Standards  of  training  and  monitoring  vary  widely  between  different 
European Member States 
•  There  are  no  uniform,  independent,  accreditation  systems  covering  all 
aspects of service and repair.  Instead, there is a  plethora of schemes for 
self-policing run by individual entities with little independent auditing. 
This leads to the situation in which both sectors are of very variable quality 
in service delivery 
•  The new technology 'lock-out' built into on-board and diagnostic systems 
limits consumer choice and ultimately increases consumer costs 
•  Franchise dealers are so tightly controlled that they are in continual conflict 
between the impositions of their 'masters' and the needs of their customers 
•  The independent sector has not developed to its fullest potential, because 
of the constraints in the market, plus its own internal fragmentation 
Equally, there are very positive elements, in both camps: 
40 Evans and Wurster, op. cit. 
41  Vehicle manufacturer response to Commission questionnaire August 2000 (12) 
60 •  There are independent repair garages who have proved in the eyes of their 
customers that they are competent and trustworthy 
•  The same is true for a proportion of franchised garages, regardless of the 
franchise 
•  The  focused  all-makes  independent  specialists  (technical  and  New 
Distribution  formats)  offer  competence  and  cost-effectiveness  in  their 
particular disciplines 
•  Vehicle manufacturers, having a limited number of exclusive sales outlets, 
have  been  able  to  maximise  the  efficiency  of  their  logistics  for  parts 
replacement  systems  (although  the  existence  of  40-odd  parallel  brand 
exclusive retailing channels must itself be of questionable economic value) 
•  Diagnostic  systems,  developed  by  independent  suppliers  for  the 
manufacturers, can be accessed remotely through computer links, allowing 
repairers (presently only the franchise sector) to reduce the need for some 
of the expensive garage based equipment at every outlet.  This is a brilliant 
reconciliation of the need for local presence and for centralised expertise.  It 
is  not,  however,  self-evident  that  these  systems  inherently  need  to  be 
marque-specific. 
The sales/  service link has lost much of its sense, as an exclusive proposition. 
There  are  potential  alternative  solutions,  although  the  independent 
aftermarket sector will have to structure and strengthen itself considerably to 
help make them real. 
6.3 Tlte forced sa!es/seroice link is not the sole option 
In examining  the  link between sales  and service  today we  are  reviewing 
Recital4 to Regulation 1475.95 which states: 
The  exclusive and selective distribution  clauses  can  be  regarded as  indispensable 
measures o/  rationalisation in the motor vehicle industry, because motor vehicles are 
consumer  durab!es  which  at both  regular  and irregular  interoa!s  require  expert 
maintenance and  repai~; not always in the same place.  Motor vehicle manu.focturers 
cooperate  with  the  selected dealers  and repairers  in order  to  provide specialised 
seroicing  .for the product.  On grounds o/  capacity and  efficiency alone_,  such a  .form o/ 
cooperation cannot be extended to an unlimited number o/  dealers and repairers.  The 
linking o/ seroicing and distribution  must be  regarded as  more  efficient  than  a 
separation between a distribu  lion organisation  .for new vehicles on the one hand  and  a 
seroicing  organisation  which  would also  distribute  spare  parts  on  the  othe~; 
particularly  a~ bifore a new vehicle is delivered to the  final  consume~; the undertaking 
within the distribution system must give it a technical inspection according to  the 
manufocturers spec!Jication. 
It is still true today that motor vehicles require 'expert maintenance and  repair at 
both regular and  irregular interoa!s' albeit less so now than in the past.  What is 
clear from our analysis, however, is that this does not necessarily have to be 
61 conducted by a set of brand-exclusive repairers who also sell the vehicles.  In 
half of the European aftermarket there is no such link.  As the market and 
quality  of product and  service  matures,  this  lack  of relationship  becomes 
increasingly evident. Vehicle manufacturers appear to be attempting to use 
new  technology  to  reverse  that  situation.  The  market  has  become 
progressively more driven by consumer choice.  A proportion of consumers is 
genuinely using the franchise network as a  preference rather than as a  felt 
obligation. 
The proposition that'  the linking of" seroicing and distribution must be regarded as 
more efficient than a separation between a distnbution organisation for new vehicles 
on the one hand and  a seroicing organisation which would also dislnbute spare parts 
on the other' has been largely refuted.  The growth of new distribution formats 
and technical specialists is a clear response to a market demand, which has 
been led by the consumers willingness  to unbundle the  sales  and service 
offering.  Specialisation by function, covering all brands, is more efficient than 
specialisation by brand, covering all  functions - when it is  allowed to take 
place. 
With respect to PDI -'particularly a~ bifore a new vehicle is delivered to the  .final 
consumer_,  the undertaking within the distnbution system must give if a technical 
inspection according to the manufocturers spec[!icalion'- we have shown that the 
tasks required are mainly simple ones, which could be carried out by any 
competent service and repair outlet that has access to the required codes and 
equipment.  Vehicle  manufacturers  themselves,  in  circumstances  of  high 
volume throughput, outsource PDI to third parties.  It is strange that such a 
relatively routine activity should have been given such prominence as  an 
argument in favour of the sales/  service link. 
For vehicle manufacturers, containing PDI, warranty and non-safety-related 
recall  actions  within a  selected  and brand-exclusive  network  ensures  that 
knowledge  of  post-factory-gate  quality  problems  is  limited  to  a  selected 
number of actors, most of whom are under the vehicle manufacturers' direct 
control. 
For consumers who want a 'one-stop shop', there clearly are certain natural 
links between sales and service.  This also provides an 'umbilical cord' to the 
product manufacturer, which is important to some consumers, in the event 
that a  problem should occur.  This is  not, however, a  reason to regard the 
sales/  service link as a universal truth or axiom. 
Regulation  1475/95 has  imposed  the  forcing  of  a  link between  sales  and 
service in the franchise sector and inadvertently curtailed the freedom of many 
of the different actors within the aftermarket.  Without this imposition, there 
might have been more opportunity for innovative offerings from a variety of 
operators  in both  the  franchise  and  non-franchise  sectors,  in  response  to 
consumer-driven market requirements. 
62 7.  Glossary 
ACEA 
ACI 
ADAC 
Aftermarket 
AK 
ANWB 
BBE 
CECRA 
CLEPA 
CLEDIPA 
DK 
EASRA 
ECAR 
EGEA 
FACONAUTO 
FEBELCAR 
FOCWA 
GIPA 
GNCR 
Grey Imports 
GVA 
lAM 
IAM-ND 
IAM-T 
ICDP 
KBA 
MEMA 
OES 
Parallel Imports 
PDI 
RACC 
RMIF 
SED 
Tii.V 
VKW 
Association des Constructeurs Europeens d'  Automobiles 
Association de Carrossiers Independants 
German Automobile Club 
All post sales activities 
Bundeskammer fur Arbeiter und Angestellte (Austria) 
Koninklijke N eder  landse T  oeristen  bond 
BBE-Unternehmensberatung GmbH 
European Council for Motor Trades and Repairs 
European Association of Automotive Suppliers 
Comite de liaison Europeen de la Distribution Independante de 
Pieces de Rechange et Equipements pour Automobiles 
Deutsches Kraftfahrzeuggewerbe 
European Automotive Services and Repairers Federation 
Campaign against design rights 
European Garage Equipment Association 
Federacion de Associaciones de Concesionarios de la Automocion 
Koninklijke Belgische Federatie der Rijtuigmakerij 
Nederlandse Vereniging van Ondernemers in het 
Carrosseriebedrijf 
Groupement Interprofessionnel de 1' Automobile 
Groupement National des Carrossiers Reparateurs 
New cars imported from outside the European Union which have 
no EC certificate of conformity to vehicle type approval 
Gesamtverband Autoteile-Handel e.V 
Independent Aftermarket 
New Distribution in the independent aftermarket- fast fits; 
autocentres; glass replacement etc 
Traditional independent aftermarket 
International Car Distribution Programme - a research 
programme mainly financed by the indus  try 
Kraftfahrt Bundesamt 
Motor Equipment Manufacturers Association 
Original Equipment Supply 
Vehicles imported into one Member State from another 
Pre-delivery Inspection 
Spanish Automobile Club 
Retail Motor Industry Federation 
Selective and Exclusive Distribution 
Technische Ueberwachungs Verein 
Vereinigung Kfz Werkstatten 
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